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Strong Secrecy for Cooperative Broadcast
Channels
Ziv Goldfeld, Gerhard Kramer, Haim H. Permuter and Paul Cuff
Abstract
A broadcast channel (BC) where the decoders cooperate via a one-sided link is considered. One common and
two private messages are transmitted and the private message to the cooperative user should be kept secret from the
cooperation-aided user. The secrecy level is measured in terms of strong secrecy, i.e., a vanishing information leakage.
An inner bound on the capacity region is derived by using a channel-resolvability-based code that double-bins the
codebook of the secret message, and by using a likelihood encoder to choose the transmitted codeword. The inner
bound is shown to be tight for semi-deterministic and physically degraded BCs and the results are compared to those
of the corresponding BCs without a secrecy constraint. Blackwell and Gaussian BC examples illustrate the impact of
secrecy on the rate regions. Unlike the case without secrecy, where sharing information about both private messages
via the cooperative link is optimal, our protocol conveys parts of the common and non-confidential messages only.
This restriction reduces the transmission rates more than the usual rate loss due to secrecy requirements. An example
that shows this loss can be strict is also provided.
Index Terms
Broadcast channel, channel resolvability, conferencing, cooperation, likelihood encoder, physical-layer security,
strong secrecy.
I. INTRODUCTION
User cooperation and security are two essential aspects of modern communication systems. Cooperation can
increase transmission rates, whereas security requirements can limit these rates. To shed light on the interaction
between these two phenomena, we study broadcast channels (BCs) with one-sided decoder cooperation and one
confidential message (Fig. 1). Cooperation is modeled as conferencing, i.e., information exchange via a rate-limited
link that extends from one receiver (referred to as the cooperative receiver) to the other (the cooperation-aided
receiver). The cooperative receiver possesses confidential information that should be kept secret from the other user.
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Fig. 1: Cooperative BCs with one confidential message.
Secret communication over noisy channels was modeled by Wyner who introduced the degraded wiretap channel
(WTC) and derived its secrecy-capacity [1]. Wyner’s wiretap code relied on a capacity-based approach, i.e., the code
is a union of subcodes that operate just below the capacity of the eavesdropper’s channel. Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [2]
generalized Wyner’s result to a general BC. Multiuser settings with secrecy have since been extensively treated in
the literature. Broadcast and interference channels with two confidential messages were studied in [3]–[7]. Gaussian
multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) BCs and WTCs were studied in [8]–[13], while [14]–[16] focus on BCs
with an eavesdropper as an external entity from which all messages are kept secret.
The above papers consider the weak secrecy metric, i.e., a vanishing information leakage rate to the eavesdropper.
Although the leakage rate vanishes asymptotically with the blocklength, the eavesdropper can decipher an increasing
number of bits of the confidential message. This drawback was highlighted in [17]–[19] (see also [20]), which
advocated using the information leakage as a secrecy measure referred to as strong secrecy. We consider strong
secrecy by relying on work by Csisza´r [20] and Hayashi [21] to relate the coding mechanism for secrecy to
channel-resolvability.
The problem of channel resolvability, closely related to the early work of Wyner [22], was formulated by Han and
Verdu´ [23] in terms of total variation (TV). Recently, [24] advocated replacing the TV metric with unnormalized
relative entropy. In [25], the coding mechanism for the resolvability problem was extended to various scenarios
under the name soft-covering lemma. These extensions were used to design secure communication protocols for
several source coding problems under different secrecy measures [26]–[29]. A resolvability-based wiretap code
associates with each message a subcode that operates just above the resolvability of the eavesdropper’s channel.
Using such constructions, [30] extended the results of [2] to strong secrecy for continuous random variables and
channels with memory. In [31] (see also [32, Remark 2.2]), resolvability-based codes were used to establish the
strong secrecy-capacities of the discrete and memoryless (DM) WTC and the DM-BC with confidential messages
by using a metric called effective secrecy.
Our inner bound on the strong secrecy-capacity region of the cooperative BC is based on a resolvability-based
Marton code. Specifically, we consider a state-dependent channel over which an encoder with non-causal access
to the state sequence aims to make the conditional probability mass function (PMF) of the channel output given
the state a product PMF. The resolvability code coordinates the transmitted codeword with the state sequence by
3means of multicoding, i.e., by associating with every message a bin that contains enough codewords to ensure
joint encoding (similar to a Gelfand-Pinsker codebook). Most encoders use joint typicality tests to determine the
transmitted codeword. We adopt the likelihood encoder, recently proposed as a coding strategy for source coding
problems [33], as our multicoding mechanism. Doing so significantly simplifies the distribution approximation
analysis. We prove that the TV between the induced output PMF and the target product PMF approaches zero
exponentially fast in the blocklength, which implies convergence in unnormalized relative entropy [34, Theorem
17.3.3].
Next, we construct a BC code in which the relation between the codewords corresponds to the relation between
the channel states and the channel inputs in the resolvability problem. To this end we associate with every
confidential message a subcode that adheres to the structure of the aforementioned resolvability code. Accordingly,
the confidential message codebook is double-binned to allow joint encoding via the likelihood encoder (outer bin
layer) and preserves confidentiality (inner bin layer). The bin sizes are determined by the rate constraints for the
resolvability problem, which ensures strong secrecy. The inner bound induced by this coding scheme is shown to
be tight for semi-deterministic (SD) and physically-degraded (PD) BCs.
Our protocol uses the cooperation link to convey information about the non-confidential message and the common
message. Without secrecy constraints, the optimal scheme shares information on both private messages as well as
the common message [35]. We show that the restricted protocol results in an additional rate loss on top of standard
losses due to secrecy. To this end we compare the achievable regions induced by each cooperation strategy for a
cooperative BC without secrecy. We show that the restricted protocol does not lose rate when the BC is deterministic
or PD, but it is sub-optimal in general.
To the best of our knowledge, we present here the first resolvability-based Marton code. This is also a first
demonstration of the likelihood encoder’s usefulness in the context of secrecy for channel coding problems. From
a broader perspective, our resolvability result is a tool for proving strong secrecy in settings with Marton coding.
As a special case, we derive the secrecy-capacity region of the SD-BC (without cooperation) where the message of
the deterministic user is confidential - a new result that has merit on its own. The structure of the obtained region
provides insight into the effect of secrecy on the coding strategy for BCs. A comparison between the cooperative
PD-BC with and without secrecy is also given.
The results are visualized by considering a Blackwell BC (BBC) [36], [37] and a Gaussian BC. An explicit
strong secrecy-achieving coding strategy for an extreme point of the BBC region is given. Although the BBC’s
input is ternary, to maximize the transmission rate of the confidential message only a binary subset of the input’s
alphabet is used. As a result, a zero-capacity channel is induced to the other user, who, therefore, cannot decode
any of the secret bits. Further, we show that in the BBC scenario, an improved subchannel (given by the identity
mapping) to the legitimate receiver does not increase the strong secrecy-capacity region.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II provides preliminaries and restates some useful basic properties. In
Section III we state a resolvability lemma. Section IV introduces the cooperative BC with one confidential message
and gives an inner bound on its strong secrecy-capacity region. The secrecy-capacity regions for the SD and PD
4scenarios are then characterized. In Section V the effect of secrecy constraints on the optimal cooperation protocol
is discussed. Section VI compares the capacity regions of SD- and PD-BCs with and without secrecy. Blackwell
and Gaussian BCs visualise the results. Finally, proofs are provided in Section VII, while Section VIII summarizes
the main achievements and insights of this work.
II. NOTATION AND PRELIMINARIES
We use the following notations. As customary N is the set of natural numbers (which does not include 0), while
R denotes the reals. We further define R+ = {x ∈ R|x ≥ 0}. Given two real numbers a, b, we denote by [a : b]
the set of integers
{
n ∈ N
∣∣⌈a⌉ ≤ n ≤ ⌊b⌋}. Calligraphic letters denote discrete sets, e.g., X , while the cardinality
of a set X is denoted by |X |. Xn stands for the n-fold Cartesian product of X . An element of Xn is denoted
by xn = (x1, x2, . . . , xn), and its substrings as xji = (xi, xi+1, . . . , xj); when i = 1, the subscript is omitted.
Whenever the dimension n is clear from the context, vectors (or sequences) are denoted by boldface letters, e.g.,
x.
Let
(
Ω,F ,P
)
be a probability space, where Ω is the sample space, F is the σ-algebra and P is the probability
measure. Random variables over
(
Ω,F ,P
)
are denoted by uppercase letters, e.g., X , with conventions for random
vectors similar to those for deterministic sequences. Namely, Xji represents the sequence of random variables
(Xi, Xi+1, . . . , Xj), while X stands for Xn. The probability of an event A ∈ F is denoted by P(A), while
P(A
∣∣B ) denotes conditional probability of A given B. We use 1A to denote the indicator function of A. The set of
all probability mass functions (PMFs) on a finite set X is denoted by P(X ). PMFs are denoted by the capital letter
P , with a subscript that identifies the random variable and its possible conditioning. For example, for two random
variables X and Y we use PX , PX,Y and PX|Y to denote, respectively, the marginal PMF of X , the joint PMF of
(X,Y ) and the conditional PMF of X given Y . In particular, PX|Y represents the stochastic matrix whose entries
are PX|Y (x|y) = P
(
X = x|Y = y
)
. We omit subscripts if the arguments of the PMF are lowercase versions of the
random variables. The support of a PMF P and the expectation of a random variable X are denoted by supp(P )
and EX , respectively.
For a countable measurable space (Ω,F), a PMF Q ∈ P(Ω) gives rise to a probability measure on (Ω,F),
which we denote by PQ; accordingly, PQ
(
A) =
∑
ω∈AQ(ω) for every A ∈ F . For a sequence of random variables
Xn we also use the following: If the entries of Xn are drawn in an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
manner according to PX , then for every x ∈ Xn we have PXn(x) =
∏n
i=1 PX(xi) and we write PXn(x) =
PnX(x). Similarly, if for every (x,y) ∈ Xn × Yn we have PY n|Xn(y|x) =
∏n
i=1 PY |X(yi|xi), then we write
PY n|Xn(y|x) = P
n
Y |X(y|x). We often use Q
n
X or Q
n
Y |X when referring to an i.i.d. sequence of random variables.
The conditional product PMF QnY |X given a specific sequence x ∈ Xn is denoted by QnY |X=x.
The empirical PMF νx of a sequence x ∈ Xn is
νx(a) ,
N(a|x)
n
(1)
where N(a|x) =
∑n
i=1 1{xi=a}. We use T nǫ (PX) to denote the set of letter-typical sequences of length n with
5respect to the PMF PX ∈ P(X ) and the non-negative number ǫ [38, Ch. 3], [39], i.e., we have
T nǫ (PX) =
{
x ∈ Xn :
∣∣νx(a)− PX(a)∣∣ ≤ ǫPX(a), ∀a ∈ X}. (2)
Definition 1 (Total Variation and Relative Entropy) Let P,Q ∈ P(X ), be two PMFs on a countable sample
space1 X . The TV and the relative entropy between P and Q are
||P −Q||TV =
1
2
∑
x∈X
∣∣P (x)−Q(x)∣∣ (3)
and
D(P ||Q) =
∑
x∈supp(P )
P (x) log
P (x)
Q(x)
(4)
respectively.
We often make use of the relative entropy chain rule which reads as follows: For two PMFs PX,Y , QX,Y ∈
P(X × Y), we have
D
(
PX,Y
∣∣∣∣QX,Y ) = D(PX ∣∣∣∣QX)+D(PY |X ∣∣∣∣QY |X∣∣PX), (5)
where D
(
PY |X
∣∣∣∣QY |X ∣∣PX) =∑x∈X PX(x)D(PY |X=x∣∣∣∣QY |X=x).
Remark 1 Pinsker’s inequality shows that relative entropy is larger than TV. A reverse inequality is sometimes
valid. For example, if P ≪ Q (i.e., P is absolutely continuous with respect to Q), and Q is an i.i.d. discrete
distribution of variables, then (see [25, Equation (29)]) 2
D(P ||Q) ∈ O
([
n+ log
1
||P −Q||TV
]
||P −Q||TV
)
. (6)
In particular, (6) implies that an exponential decay of the TV in n produces an exponential decay of the informational
divergence with the same exponent.
III. A CHANNEL RESOLVABILITY LEMMA FOR STRONG SECRECY
Consider a state-dependent discrete memoryless channel (DMC) over which an encoder with non-causal access
to the i.i.d. state sequence transmits a codeword (Fig. 2). Each channel state is a pair (S0, S) of random variables
drawn according to QS0,S ∈ P(S0 ×S). The encoder superimposes its codebook on S0 and then uses a likelihood
encoder with respect to S to choose the channel input sequence. The structure of a subcode that is superimposed
on some s0 ∈ Sn0 is also illustrated in Fig. 2. The conditional PMF of the channel output, given the states, should
approximate a conditional product distribution in terms of unnormalized relative entropy. A formal description of
the setup is as follows.
1Countable sample spaces are assumed throughout this work.
2f(n) ∈ O
(
g(n)
)
means that f(n) ≤ k · g(n), for some k independent of n and sufficiently large n.
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under a resolvability codebook that is superimposed
on s0 ∈ Sn0 : For each s0 ∈ Sn0 , the codebook Bn(s0) contains 2n(R˜+R
′) u-codewords drawn independently according
to QnU|S0=s0 . The codewords are partitioned into 2
nR˜ bins, each associated with a certain w ∈
[
1 : 2nR˜
]
. To transmit
W = w the likelihood encoder from (7) is used to choose a u-codeword for the wth bin.
Let S0, S, U and V be finite sets. Fix any QS0,S,U,V ∈ P(S0 × S × U × V) and let W be a random variable
uniformly distributed over W =
[
1 : 2nR˜
]
that is independent of (S0,S) ∼ QnS0,S .
Codebook: For every s0 ∈ Sn0 , let Bn(s0) ,
{
U(s0, w, i)
}
(w,i)∈W×I
, where I =
[
1 : 2nR
′]
, be a collection
of3 2n(R˜+R′) conditionally independent random vectors of length n, each distributed according to QnU|S0=s0 . A
realization of Bn(s0), for s0 ∈ Sn0 , is denoted by Bn(s0) ,
{
u(s0, w, i,Bn)
}
(w,i)∈W×I
. Each codebook Bn(s0)
can be thought of as comprising 2nR˜ bins, each associated with a different message w ∈ W and contains 2nR′
u-codewords. We also denote Bn ,
{
Bn(s0)
}
s0∈Sn0
, which is referred to as the random resolvability codebook,
and use Bn for its realization.
Encoding and Induced PMF: Consider the likelihood encoder described by conditional PMF
Pˆ (Bn)(i|w, s0, s) =
QnS|U,S0
(
s
∣∣u(s0, w, i,Bn), s0)∑
i′∈I
QnS|U,S0
(
s
∣∣u(s0, w, i′,Bn), s0) . (7)
Upon observing (w, s0, s), an index i ∈ I is drawn randomly according to (7). The codeword u(s0, w, i,Bn) is
passed through the DMC QnV |U,S0,S . For a fixed codebook Bn, the induced joint distribution is
P (Bn)(s0, s, w, i,u,v) = Q
n
S0,S(s0, s)2
−nR˜Pˆ (Bn)(i|w, s0, s)1{
u(s0,w,i,Bn)=u
}QnV |U,S0,S(v|u, s0, s). (8)
Lemma 1 (Sufficient Conditions for Approximation) For any QS0,S,U,V ∈ P(S0×S×U ×V), if (R˜, R′) ∈ R2+
satisfies
R′ > I(U ;S|S0) (9a)
R′ + R˜ > I(U ;S, V |S0), (9b)
3To simplify notation, from here on out we assume that quantities of the form 2nR , where n ∈ N and R ∈ R+, are integers. Otherwise,
simple modifications of some of the subsequent expressions using floor operations are needed.
7then
EBnD
(
P
(Bn)
V|S0,S
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnV |S0,S∣∣∣QnS0,S) −−−−→n→∞ 0. (10)
The proof of Lemma 1 is given in Section VII-A and it shows that the TV decays exponentially fast with the
blocklength n. By Remark 1 this implies an exponential decay of the desired relative entropy. Another useful
property is that the chosen u-codeword is jointly letter-typical with (S0,S) with high probability.
Lemma 2 (Typical with High Probability) If (R˜, R′) ∈ R2+ satisfies (9), then for any w ∈ W and ǫ > 0, we
have
EBnPP (Bn)
((
S0,S,U(S0, w, I)
)
/∈ T nǫ (QS0,S,U)
)
−−−−→
n→∞
0. (11)
The proof of Lemma 2 is given in Section VII-B.
IV. COOPERATIVE BROADCAST CHANNELS WITH ONE CONFIDENTIAL MESSAGE
A. Problem Definition
The cooperative DM-BC with one confidential message is illustrated in Fig. 1. The channel has one sender
and two receivers. The sender chooses a triple (m0,m1,m2) of indices uniformly and independently from the set[
1 : 2nR0
]
×
[
1 : 2nR1
]
×
[
1 : 2nR2
]
and maps it to a sequence x ∈ Xn. The sequence x is transmitted over a
BC with transition probability QY1,Y2|X : X → P(Y1 × Y2). If QY1,Y2|X factors as 1{Y1=g(X)}QY2|X , for some
deterministic g : X → Y1, or QY1|XQY2|Y1 then we call the BC SD or PD, respectively. Furthermore, a BC is
said to be deterministic if QY1,Y2|X = 1{Y1=g(X)}∩{Y2=h(X)}, for some deterministic functions g as before and
h : X → Y2. The output sequence yj ∈ Ynj , where j = 1, 2, is received by decoder j. Decoder j produces
a pair of estimates
(
mˆ
(j)
0 , mˆj
)
of (m0,mj). Furthermore, the message m1 is to be kept secret from Decoder 2.
There is a one-sided noiseless cooperation link of rate R12 from Decoder 1 to Decoder 2. By conveying a message
m12 ∈
[
1 : 2nR12
]
over this link, Decoder 1 can share with Decoder 2 information about y1,
(
mˆ
(1)
0 , mˆ1
)
, or both.
Definition 2 (Code) An (n,R12, R0, R1, R2) code cn for the BC with cooperation and one confidential message
has:
1) Four message sets M12 =
[
1 : 2nR12
]
and Mj =
[
1 : 2nRj
]
, for j = 0, 1, 2.
2) A stochastic encoder f :M0 ×M1 ×M2 → P(Xn).
3) A decoder cooperation function g12 : Yn1 →M12.
4) Two decoding functions φ1 : Yn1 →M0 ×M1 and φ2 :M12 × Yn2 →M0 ×M2.
The joint distribution induced by an (n,R12, R0, R1, R2) code cn is:
P (cn)
(
m0,m1,m2,x,y1,y2,m12,
(
mˆ
(1)
0 , mˆ1
)
,
(
mˆ
(2)
0 , mˆ2
))
= 2−n(R0+R1+R2)f(x|m0,m1,m2)
×QnY1,Y2|X(y1,y2|x)1
{
mˆ12=g12(y1)
}
∩
{(
mˆ
(1)
0 ,mˆ1
)
=φ1(y1)
}
∩
{(
mˆ
(2)
0 ,mˆ2
)
=φ2(m12,y2)
}. (12)
8The performance of cn is evaluated in terms of its rate tuple (R12, R0, R1, R2), the average decoding error probability
and the strong secrecy metric.
Definition 3 (Error Probability) The average error probability for an (n,R12, R0, R1, R2) code cn is
Pe(cn) = PP (cn)
(
(Mˆ
(1)
0 , Mˆ
(2)
0 , Mˆ1, Mˆ2) 6= (M0,M0,M1,M2)
)
,
where
(
Mˆ
(1)
0 , Mˆ1
)
= φ1(Y1) and
(
Mˆ
(2)
0 , Mˆ2
)
= φ2
(
g12(Y1,Y2)
)
.
Definition 4 (Information Leakage) The information leakage at receiver 2 under an (n,R12, R0, R1, R2) code
cn is
L(cn) = I(M1;M12, Y
n
2 ), (13)
where the mutual information calculated with respect to the marginal PMF P (Bn)M1,M12,Y2 induced by (12).
Definition 5 (Achievability) A rate tuple (R12, R0, R1, R2) ∈ R4+ is achievable if for any ǫ > 0 there is an
(n,R12, R0, R1, R2) code Cn, such that for any n sufficiently large
Pe(cn) ≤ ǫ (14a)
L(cn) ≤ ǫ. (14b)
The strong secrecy-capacity region CS is the closure of the set of the achievable rates.
B. Strong Secrecy-Capacity Bounds and Results
We state an inner bound on the strong secrecy-capacity region CS of a cooperative BC with one confidential
message.
Theorem 1 (Inner Bound) Let QY1,Y2|X be a BC and let RI be the closure of the union of rate tuples
(R12, R0, R1, R2) ∈ R4+ satisfying:
R1 ≤ I(U1;Y1|U0)− I(U1;U2, Y2|U0) (15a)
R0 +R1 ≤ I(U0, U1;Y1)− I(U1;U2, Y2|U0) (15b)
R0 +R2 ≤ I(U0, U2;Y2) +R12 (15c)
R0 +R1 +R2 ≤ I(U0, U1;Y1) + I(U2;Y2|U0)− I(U1;U2, Y2|U0) (15d)
where the union is over all PMFs QU0,U1,U2,X , each inducing a joint distribution QU0,U1,U2,XQY1,Y2|X . Then the
following inclusion holds:
RI ⊆ CS. (16)
9Furthermore, RI is convex and one may choose |U0| ≤ |X |+ 5, |U1| ≤ |X | and |U2| ≤ |X |.
The proof of Theorem 1 relies on a channel-resolvability-based Marton code and is given in Section VII-C.
Two key ingredients allow us keeping M1 secret while still utilizing the cooperation link to help Receiver 2. First,
the cooperation strategy is modified compared to the case without secrecy that was studied in [35], where M12
conveyed information about both private messages as well as the common message. Here, the confidentiality of
M1 restricts the cooperation message from containing any information about M1, and therefore, we use an M12
that is a function of (M0,M2) only. Since the protocol requires Receiver 1 to decode the information it shares
with Receiver 2, this modified cooperation strategy results in a rate loss in R1 when compared to [35]; the loss is
expressed in the first mutual information term in (15a) being conditioned on U0 rather than having U0 next to U1.
The second ingredient is associating with each m1 ∈M1 a resolvability-subcode that adheres to the construction
for Lemmas 1 and 2 described in Section III. By doing so, the relations between the codewords in the Marton code
correspond to those between the channel states and its input in the resolvability problem. Marton coding combines
superposition coding and binning, hence the different roles the state sequences S0 and S play in our resolvability
setup. Reliability is established with the help of Lemma 2, while invoking Lemma 1 ensures strong secrecy.
The inner bound from Theorem 1 is tight for SD- and PD-BCs, giving rise to the new strong secrecy-capacity
results stated in Theorems 2 and 3.
Theorem 2 (SD-BC Secrecy-Capacity) The strong secrecy-capacity region C(SD)S of a cooperative SD-BC
1{Y1=g(X)}QY2|X with one confidential message is the closure of the union of rate tuples (R12, R0, R1, R2) ∈ R4+
satisfying:
R1 ≤ H(Y1|W,V, Y2) (17a)
R0 +R1 ≤ H(Y1|W,V, Y2) + I(W ;Y1) (17b)
R0 +R2 ≤ I(W,V ;Y2) +R12 (17c)
R0 +R1 +R2 ≤ H(Y1|W,V, Y2) + I(V ;Y2|W ) + I(W ;Y1) (17d)
where the union is over all PMFs QW,V,Y1,X with Y1 = g(X), each inducing a joint distribution QW,V,Y1,XQY2|X .
Furthermore, C(SD)S is convex and one may choose |W| ≤ |X |+ 3 and |V| ≤ |X |.
The direct part of Theorem 2 follows from Theorem 1 by setting U0 = W , U1 = Y1 and U2 = V . The converse
is proven in Section VII-D.
Theorem 3 (PD-BC Secrecy-Capacity) The strong secrecy-capacity region C(PD)S of a cooperative PD-BC
QY1|XQY2|Y1 with on confidential message is the closure of the union of rate tuples (R12, R0, R1, R2) ∈ R4+
satisfying:
R1 ≤ I(X ;Y1|W )− I(X ;Y2|W ) (18a)
10
R0 +R2 ≤ I(W ;Y2) +R12 (18b)
R0 +R1 +R2 ≤ I(X ;Y1)− I(X ;Y2|W ) (18c)
where the union is over all PMFs QW,X , each inducing a joint distribution QW,XQY1|XQY2|Y1 . Furthermore, C(PD)S
is convex and one may choose |W| ≤ |X |+ 2.
The achievability of C(PD)S is a consequence of Theorem 1 by taking U0 = W , U1 = X and U2 = 0. For the
converse see Section VII-E.
Remark 2 (Converse) We use two distinct converse proofs for Theorems 2 and 3. In the converse of Theorem 2,
the bound in (17d) does not involve R12 since the auxiliary random variable Wi contains M12. With respect to this
choice of Wi, showing that W −X − (Y1, Y2) forms a Markov chain relies on the SD property of the channel. For
the PD-BC, however, such an auxiliary is not feasible as it violates the Markov relation W −X−Y1−Y2 induced
by the channel. To circumvent this, in the converse of Theorem 3 we define Wi without M12 and use the structure of
the channel to keep R12 from appearing in (18c). Specifically, this argument relies on the relation M12 = f12(Y1)
and that Y2 is a degraded version of Y1, implying that all three messages (M0,M1,M2) are reliably decodable
from Y1 only.
Remark 3 (Weak versus Strong Secrecy) The results of Theorems 1, 2 and 3 remain unchanged if the strong
secrecy requirement (see (13) and (14b)) is replaced with the weak secrecy constraint. As weak secrecy refers to a
vanishing normalized information leakage, to formally define the corresponding achievability, one should replace
the left-hand side (LHS) of (14b) with 1nL(cn). To see that the results of the preceding theorems coincide under
both metrics, first notice that strong secrecy implies weak secrecy (which validates the claim from Theorem 1).
Furthermore, the converse proofs of Theorems 2 and 3 (given in Sections VII-D and VII-E, respectively) are readily
reformulated under the weak secrecy metric by replacing ǫ with nǫ in (66)-(67) and (79)-(80).
Remark 4 (Cardinality Bounds) The cardinality bounds on the auxiliary random variables in Theorems 1, 2
and 3 are established using the perturbation method [40] and the Eggleston-Fenchel-Carathe´odory theorem [41,
Theorem 18].
V. SUB-OPTIMAL COOPERATION WITHOUT SECRECY
The cooperation protocol for the BC with a secret M1 uses the cooperative link to convey information that is
a function of the non-confidential message and the common message. Without secrecy constraints, it was shown
in [35] that the best cooperation strategy uses a public message that comprises parts of both private messages as
well as the common message. To understand whether the restricted protocol reduces the transmission rates beyond
standard losses due to secrecy (which are discussed in Section VI), we compare the achievable regions induced
by each scheme for the cooperative BC without secrecy. The formal description of this BC instance (see [35])
closely follows the definitions from Section IV-A up to removing the security requirement (14b) from Definition 5
11
of achievability. For simplicity we consider the setting without a common message, i.e., when R0 = 0.
To isolate the (possible) rate-loss due to the restricted cooperation scheme used in this paper from other losses due
to secrecy, we subsequently describe an adaptation of our coding scheme to the case where M1 is not confidential.
Namely, we remove the secrecy requirement on M1 but still limit the cooperation protocol to share information
on M2 only. This results in an achievable scheme for the cooperative BC with no security requirements, and the
induced achievable region is compared with the result from [35].
At first glance it might seem that even without secrecy requirements, the restricted cooperation protocol is optimal.
After all, why should the cooperative receiver (Decoder 1) share information about M1 with the cooperation-aided
receiver (Decoder 2), which is not required to decode it? Yet, we show that this intuitive argument fails and that
the restricted protocol is sub-optimal in general. For BCs in which Decoder 1 can decode more than nR12 bits of
M2 (e.g., PD-BCs), both protocols achieve the same rates and M1 need not be shared. However, when Decoder 1
can decode strictly less than nR12 bits of M2, then sharing M1 achieves higher R2 values, since now M1 serves
as side information for Decoder 2 in decoding M2 (note that this side information is also available at the encoder).
The achievable region RNS for the cooperative BC without secrecy that was characterized in [35] (see also [42],
[43]) is the union over the same domain as (15) of rate triples (R12, R1, R2) ∈ R3+ satisfying:
R1 ≤ I(U0, U1;Y1) (19a)
R2 ≤ I(U0, U2;Y2) +R12 (19b)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(U0, U1;Y1) + I(U2;Y2|U0)− I(U1;U2|U0) (19c)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(U1;Y1|U0) + I(U0, U2;Y2)− I(U1;U2|U0) +R12. (19d)
The cooperation scheme that achieves (19) uses the pair (M10,M20) (where Mj0 refers to the public part of the
message Mj and has rate Rj0 ≤ Rj , for j = 1, 2) as a public message that is decoded by both users. The public
message codebook (generated by i.i.d. realizations of the random variable U0 in (19)) is partitioned into 2nR12 bins
and is first decoded by User 1. Next, the bin number M12 of the decoded public message is shared with User 2
over the cooperative link, which reduces the search space by a factor of 2nR12 . The presence of M10 in the public
message essentially allows User 1 to achieve rates up I(U0, U1;Y1).
Introducing a secrecy constraint on M1, we must remove M10 from the public message, but we keep the rest of
the protocol unchanged. The region R˜NS achieved by the restricted cooperation protocol is derived by repeating
the steps in the proof of [35, Theorem 6] while setting R10 = 0. One obtains that R˜NS is characterized by the
same rate bounds as (19), up to replacing (19a) with
R1 ≤ I(U1;Y1|U0) +
[
I(U2;Y2|U0)− I(U1;U2|U0)
]+
(20)
where [x]+ = max
{
0, x
}
. Clearly R˜NS ⊆ RNS.
Note that R˜NS = RNS for any BC where setting U0 = 0 in (19) is optimal. In particular, we have the following
proposition.
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Proposition 4 (Restricted Cooperation is Optimal for Deterministic and PD BCs) If a BC QY1,Y2|X is PD,
i.e., QY1,Y2|X = QY1|XQY2|Y1 , or deterministic, i.e., QY1,Y2|X = 1{Y1=g(X)}∩{Y2=h(X)}, then R˜NS = RNS = CNS.
Proof: For the PD-BC, setting U0 = W , U1 = X and U2 = 0 into R˜NS recovers the region from [44, Equation
(17)], which is the capacity region of the cooperative PD-BC. The capacity region of the cooperative deterministic
BC (DBC) given in [35, Corollary 12] is recovered from R˜NS by taking U0 = 0, U1 = Y1 and U2 = Y2.
Proposition 5 (Restricted Cooperation Sub-Optimal) There exist BCs QY1,Y2|X for which R˜NS ( RNS.
The proof of Proposition 5 is given in Appendix A, where we construct an example for which the maximal
achievable R1 in both regions is the same, but the highest achievable R2 while keeping R1 at its maximum is
strictly smaller in R˜NS.
We start with a family of BCs as illustrated in Fig. 3, where the channel input is X = (X1, X2), the output
Y1 is produced by feeding X1 into a binary symmetric channel (BSC) with crossover probability 0.1 4, while Y2
is generated by the DMC QY2|X1,X2 . All alphabets are binary, i.e., X1 = X2 = Y1 = Y2 =
{
0, 1
}
. The maximal
achievable R1 in both schemes is the capacity of the aforementioned BSC, i.e., c , 1−H2(0.1), where H2 is the
binary entropy function. We also set the capacity of the cooperation link to R12 = c. We show that the highest
R2 such that (R12, R1, R2) = (c, c, R2) ∈ RNS is lower bounded by the capacity of the state-dependent channel
QY2|X1,X2 (with X1 and X2 playing the roles of the state and the input, respectively) with non-causal channel
state information (CSI) available at the transmitting and receiving ends. This is because R12 = c in the permissive
protocol allows Decoder 1 to share the decoded Xn1 with Decoder 2 despite being dependent on M1.
The corresponding value of R2 in R˜NS is then upper bounded by the capacity of the same channel but with
non-causal CSI at the transmitter only (also known as a Gelfand-Pinsker (GP) channel). The cooperation link is, in
fact, useless in this scenario since the entire capacity of the BSC was used to reliably convey bits of M1, on which
the restricted protocol prohibits exchanging information. Thus, the proof boils down to choosing QY2|X1,X2 as a
channel for which the capacity with full CSI is strictly larger than the GP capacity. The binary dirty-paper (BDP)
channel [45]–[47] qualifies and completes the proof.
4The actual value of the crossover probability is of no real importance as long as it is not 0.5.
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VI. EFFECT OF SECRECY ON THE CAPACITY-REGION OF COOPERATIVE BROADCAST CHANNELS
The impact of the secrecy constraint on M1 on the cooperation strategy and the resulting reduction of transmission
rates was discussed in Section V. Furthermore, secrecy requirements affect BC codes even when no user cooperation
is allowed. Thus, when considering a scenario that combines secrecy and cooperation, both these effects occur
simultaneously. We highlight this by comparing the SD and PD versions of the cooperative BC to their corresponding
models without secrecy. For simplicity, throughout this section we again assume BCs with private messages only,
i.e., R0 = 0.
A. Semi-Deterministic Broadcast Channels
1) Capacity Region Comparison: Consider the SD-BC without cooperation (i.e., where R12 = 0) in which M1
is secret. By Theorem 2, the strong secrecy-capacity region of the SD-BC with one confidential message, which
was an unsolved problem until this work, is as follows.
Corollary 6 (Secrecy-Capacity for SD-BC without Cooperation) The strong secrecy-capacity region C˜(SD)S of
the SD-BC 1{Y1=g(X)}QY2|X with one confidential message is the union of rate pairs (R1, R2) ∈ R2+ satisfying:
R1 ≤ H(Y1|V, Y2) (21a)
R2 ≤ I(V ;Y2) (21b)
where the union is over all PMFs QV,Y1,X with Y1 = g(X), each inducing a joint distribution QV,Y1,XQY2|X .
The region (21) coincides with C(SD)S in (17d) (where R12 = R0 = 0) by noting that the bound (17d) is
redundant because if QW,V,Y1,XQY2|X is a PMF for which (17d) is active, then replacing W and V with W˜ = 0
and V˜ = (W,V ) achieves a larger region. Removing (17d) from C(SD)S and setting V˜ = (W,V ) recovers (21).
Marton coding achieves the capacity region of the classic SD-BC [48]. The capacity is the union of rate pairs
(R1, R2) ∈ R2+ satisfying:
R1 ≤ H(Y1) (22a)
R2 ≤ I(V ;Y2) (22b)
R1 +R2 ≤ H(Y1|V ) + I(V ;Y2) (22c)
where the union is over the same domain as in Corollary 6.
The regions in (21) and (22) (for a fixed PMF) are depicted in Fig. 4. When M1 is secret, one can no longer
operate on both corner points of Marton’s region. Rather, the optimal coding scheme is the one with the lower
transmission rate to the 1st user. This essentially means that the redundancy in the codebook needed for multicoding
befalls solely on User 1 (whose message is to be kept secret). Consequently, a loss of I(V ;Y1), which corresponds
to the sizes of the bins used for joint encoding, is inflicted on R1. An additional rate-loss of I(Y1;Y2|V ) in R1 is
caused by a second layer of binning used to conceal M1 from the 2nd user. A coding scheme for the higher corner
14
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Fig. 5: (a) Cooperative Blackwell BC; (b) Cooperative Blackwell-like PD-BC.
point of the region without secrecy, i.e., the point
(
H(Y1) , I(V ;Y2)−I(V ;Y1)
)
, is not feasible with secrecy since
the larger value of R1 violates the secrecy constraint. A similar effect occurs for the corresponding regions with
cooperation.
2) Blackwell BC Example: Suppose the channel from the transmitter to receivers 1 and 2 is the BBC without a
common message as illustrated in Fig 5(a) [36], [37]. Using Theorem 2 while setting R0 = 0, the strong secrecy-
capacity region of a deterministic BC (DBC) is the following.
Corollary 7 (Secrecy-Capacity Region for DBC) The strong secrecy-capacity region C(D)S of a cooperative DBC
1{Y1=g(X)}∩{Y2=h(X)} with one confidential message is the union of rate triples (R12, R1, R2) ∈ R3+ satisfying:
R1 ≤ H(Y1|Y2) (23a)
R2 ≤ H(Y2) +R12 (23b)
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R1 +R2 ≤ H(Y1, Y2) (23c)
where the union is over all PMFs QX .
Corollary 7 follows by arguments similar to those in the proof of [35, Corollary 12]. By parameterizing the input
PMF QX as
QX(0) = α , QX(1) = β , QX(2) = 1− α− β (24)
where α, β ∈ R+ and α+ β ≤ 1, the strong secrecy-capacity region of the BBC is:
C
(BBC)
S =
⋃
α,β∈R+,
α+β≤1


(R12, R1, R2) ∈ R
3
+
R1 ≤ (1− α)Hb
(
β
1−α
)
R2 ≤ Hb(α) +R12
R1 +R2 ≤ Hb(α) + (1− α)Hb(
β
1−α )


. (25)
The projection of C(BBC)S onto the plane (R1, R2) for different values of R12 is shown in Fig. 6(a). For every
R12 ∈ R+, the maximal achievable R1 in C(BBC)S equals 1 [bits/use] (while the corresponding R2 is zero). The rate
triple (R12, 1, 0) is achieved by setting α = 0 and β = 12 in the bounds in (25). These probability values provide
insight into the coding strategy that maximizes the transmission rate to User 1. Namely, the encoder chooses each
channel input symbol uniformly from the set {1, 2} ( X . By doing so, Decoder 1 effectively sees a clean binary
channel (by mapping every received Y1 = 0 to the input symbol X = 2) with capacity 1. Decoder 2, on the other
hand, sees a flat channel with zero capacity since both X = 1 and X = 2 are mapped to Y2 = 1. Thus, Decoder 2
has no information about the transmitted sequence, and therefore, strong secrecy is achieved while conveying one
secured bit to Decoder 1 in each channel use.
Remark 5 An improved subchannel to the legitimate user does not enlarge the strong secrecy-capacity region. We
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illustrate this by considering the Blackwell-like PD-BC (PD-BBC) shown in Fig. 5(b), where Y1 = X and Y1 = X
(Y2 and the mapping from X to Y2 remain as in the BBC). Evaluating the strong secrecy-capacity region of the
PD-BBC reveals that it coincides with C(BBC)S . This implies that the QX that maximizes R1 while keeping Decoder
2 ignorant of M1 is α = 0 and β = 12 , which coincides with the input PMF that maximizes R1 while transmitting
over the classical BBC. Thus, to ensure secrecy over the PD-BBC, the encoder overlooks the improved channel to
Decoder 1 and ends up not using the symbol X = 0.
The effect of secrecy on the capacity region of a cooperative BC is illustrated by comparing to the BBC (Fig.
5(a)) without a secrecy constraint. Using the characterization of the capacity region of a cooperative DBC given in
[35, Corollary 12] and the parametrization in (24), the capacity region of the cooperative BBC is:
C
(BBC)
NS =
⋃
α,β∈R+,
α+β≤1


(R12, R1, R2) ∈ R
3
+
R1 ≤ Hb(α+ β)
R2 ≤ Hb(α) +R12
R1 +R2 ≤ Hb(α) + (1− α)Hb(
β
1−α )


. (26)
Fig. 6(b) compares the regions with and without secrecy. The dashed red line represents the capacity region
for the case without secrecy while the blue line depicts the region where M1 is confidential. Evidently, C(BBC)NS
is strictly larger than C(BBC)S . Note that up to approximately R1 ≈ 0.6597 , R
(Th)
1 , the two regions coincide.
Thus, while R1 ≤ R(Th)1 , concealing M1 is achieved without any rate loss in R2. When R1 > R
(Th)
1 , however, an
increased confidential message rate leads to a reduced R2 value compared to the case without secrecy. Further, if
no secrecy constraint is imposed on M1, one can transmit it at its maximal rate of R1 = 1 and still have a positive
value of R2 (up to approximately 0.5148). When M1 is confidential then R1 = 1 is achievable only if R2 = 0.
B. Physically Degraded BCs
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1) Capacity Region Comparison: When the BC is PD, the reduction in R1 is due to the extra layer of bins in
the codebook of M1 only, while the modified cooperation scheme results in no loss (in accordance with Proposition
4). To see this, consider the capacity region C(PD)NS of cooperative PD-BC without a secrecy constraint on M1 (see
[44] and [49]), which is the union over the same domain as (18) of rate triples (R12, R1, R2) ∈ R3+ satisfying:
R1 ≤ I(X ;Y1|W ) (27a)
R2 ≤ I(W ;Y2) +R12 (27b)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(X ;Y1). (27c)
In contrast to the SD case, the only impact of the secrecy requirement on the capacity region is expressed in
a rate-loss of I(X ;Y2|W ) in R1 (see (18a) in comparison to (27a)) that is due to the extra layer of bins needed
for secrecy. Otherwise, the optimal code construction (and the optimal cooperation protocol) for both problems is
the same. The similarity is because, whether M1 is secret or not, its codebook is superimposed on the codebook
of M2, and decoding M2 as part of the cooperation protocol comes without cost by the degraded property of
the channel. Thus, for a fixed QW,X , if (R12, R1, R2) ∈ C(PD)NS then
(
R12,
[
R1 − I(X ;Y2|W )
]+
, R2
)
∈ C
(PD)
S ,
and vice versa. This relation is illustrated in Fig. 7 for some fixed value of R12 and under the assumption that
I(W ;Y2) +R12 > I(W ;Y1).
2) Gaussian BC Example: Consider next the cooperative Gaussian PD-BC (without a common message) shown
in Fig. 8, where for every time instance i ∈ [1 : n], we have
Y1,i = Xi + Z1,i, (28a)
Y2,i = Xi + Z1,i + Z2,i (28b)
and
{
Z1,i
}n
i=1
and
{
Z2,i
}n
i=1
are mutually independent sequences of i.i.d. Gaussian random variables with Z1,i ∼
N (0, N1), Z2,i ∼ N (0, N2 −N1) and N2 > N1, for i ∈ [1 : n]. The channel input is subject to an average power
constraint
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
[
Xi
]
≤ P. (29)
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Fig. 9: (a) Projection of the strong secrecy-capacity region of the cooperative Gaussian BC with one confidential
message onto the plane (R1, R2) for different values of R12; (b) Cooperative Gaussian BC with R12 = 0.2: Strong
secrecy-capacity region where M1 is confidential vs. capacity region without secrecy.
By using continuous alphabets with an input power constraint adaptation of Theorem 3 we characterize the strong
secrecy-capacity region of the cooperative Gaussian PD-BC with one confidential message as
C
(G)
S =
⋃
α∈[0,1]


(R12, R1, R2) ∈ R
3
+
R1 ≤
1
2 log
(
1 + αPN1
)
− 12 log
(
1 + αPN2
)
R2 ≤
1
2 log
(
1 + α¯PαP+N2
)
+R12
R1 +R2 ≤
1
2 log
(
1 + PN1
)
− 12 log
(
1 + αPN2
)


. (30)
The achievability of (30) follows from Theorem 3 with the following choice of random variables:
W ∼ N (0, αP ) , W˜ ∼ N (0, α¯P ) , X = W + W˜ (31)
where W and W˜ are independent. The optimality of Gaussian inputs is proven in Appendix B.
Setting P = 11, N1 = 1 and N2 = 4, Fig. 9(a) shows the strong secrecy-capacity region of the cooperative
Gaussian BC for different R12 values, while Fig. 9(b) compares the optimal rate regions when a secrecy constraint
on M1 is and is not present. The red line in both figures coincide and represent the secrecy-capacity region when
R12 = 0.2. The dashed blue line in Fig 9(b) shows the capacity region of the cooperative Gaussian BC without
secrecy constraints, which is given by
C
(G)
NS =
⋃
α∈[0,1]


(R12, R1, R2) ∈ R
3
+
R1 ≤
1
2 log
(
1 + αPN1
)
R2 ≤
1
2 log
(
1 + α¯PαP+N2
)
+R12
R1 +R2 ≤
1
2 log
(
1 + PN1
)


. (32)
The derivation of (32) relies on [44, Eq. (17)] and uses standard arguments for proving the optimality of Gaussian
inputs.
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By the structure of the rate bounds in (30) and (32), for every fixed α ∈ [0, 1], if (R12, R1, R2) ∈ C(G)NS , we have(
R12, R1 −
1
2
log
(
1 +
αP
N2
)
, R2
)
∈ C
(G)
S . (33)
This agrees with the discussion in Section VI-B1 as I(X ;Y2|W ) = 12 log
(
1 + αPN2
)
.
VII. PROOFS
A. Proof of Lemma 1
Note that the factorization in (8) implies that P (Bn)S0,S = QnS0,S , for every codebook Bn. Therefore, to establish
Lemma 1 we show that
EBnD
(
P
(Bn)
S0,S,V
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnS0,S,V ) −−−−→n→∞ 0. (34)
Lemma 3 (Absolute Continuity) For any fixed codebook Bn, we have P (Bn)S0,S,V ≪ QnS0,S,V , i.e., P
(Bn)
S0,S,V
is
absolutely continues with respect to QnS0,S,V .
The proof of Lemma 3 is relegated to Appendix C. Combining this with Remark 1, a sufficient condition for
(34) is that
EBn
∣∣∣∣∣∣P (Bn)S0,S,V −QnS0,S,V ∣∣∣∣∣∣ −−−−→n→∞ 0. (35)
To evaluate the TV in (35), define the ideal PMF on Sn0 × Sn ×W × I × Un × Vn as
Γ(Bn)(s0, w, i,u, s,v) = Q
n
S0(s0)2
−n(R˜+R′)
1{
u(s0,w,i,Bn)=u
}QnS|U,S0(s|u, s0)QnV |U,S0,S(v|u, s0, s) (36)
with respect to the same codebook Bn as P (Bn). Note, however, that Γ describes an encoding process where the
choice of the u-codeword from a certain bin is uniform, as opposed to P that uses a likelihood encoder. Furthermore,
the structure of Γ implies that the sequence s is generated by feeding s0 and the chosen u-codeword into the DMC
QnS|U,S0 .
Using the TV triangle inequality, we upper bound the LHS of (35) by
EBn
∣∣∣∣∣∣P (Bn)S0,S,V −QnS0,S,V ∣∣∣∣∣∣TV ≤ EBn
∣∣∣∣∣∣P (Bn)S0,S,V − Γ(Bn)S0,S,V∣∣∣∣∣∣TV + EBn
∣∣∣∣∣∣Γ(Bn)S0,S,V −QnS0,S,V ∣∣∣∣∣∣TV. (37)
By [25, Corollary VII.5], the second expected TV on the RHS of (37) decays exponentially fast as n→∞ if
R˜+R′ > I(U ;S, V |S0). (38)
For the first term in (37), we use the following relations between Γ and P . For every fixed codebook Bn, we
have
Γ
(Bn)
I|W,S0,S
= Pˆ f
(Bn)
I|W,S0,S
= P
(Bn)
I|W,S0,S
(39a)
Γ
(Bn)
U|I,W,S0,S
= 1{
U=U(S0,W,I,Bn)
} = P (Bn)U|I,W,S0,S (39b)
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Γ
(Bn)
V|U,I,W,S0,S
= QnV |U,S0,S = P
(Bn)
V|U,I,W,S0,S
. (39c)
While (39b)-(39c) follow directly from (8) and (36), the justification for (39a) is that for every (s0, s, w, i) ∈
Sn0 × S
n ×W × I, we have
Γ(Bn)(i|w, s0, s) =
Γ(Bn)(s0, w, i, s)
Γ(Bn)(s0, w, s)
=
∑
uQ
n
S0
(s0)2
−n(R˜+R′)
1{
u(s0,w,i,Bn)=u
}QnS|U,S0(s|u, s0)∑
u,i′ Q
n
S0
(s0)2−n(R˜+R
′)1{
u(s0,w,i′,Bn)=u
}QnS|U,S0(s|u, s0)
=
QnS|U,S0
(
s
∣∣u(s0, w, i,Bn), s0)∑
i′ Q
n
S|U,S0
(
s
∣∣u(s0, w, i′,Bn), s0)
(a)
= Pˆ (Bn)(i|w, s0, s) (40)
where (a) follows from (7). The relations in (39) yield
EBn
∣∣∣∣∣∣P (Bn)S0,S,V − Γ(Bn)S0,S,V∣∣∣∣∣∣TV ≤ EBn
∣∣∣∣∣∣P (Bn)S0,S,W,I,U,V − Γ(Bn)S0,S,W,I,U,V∣∣∣∣∣∣TV
(a)
=
∑
w
2−nR˜EBn
∣∣∣∣∣∣P (Bn)S0,S,I,U,V|W=w − Γ(Bn)S0,S,I,U,V|W=w∣∣∣∣∣∣TV
(b)
= EBn
∣∣∣∣∣∣P (Bn)S0,S,I,U,V|W=1 − Γ(Bn)S0,S,I,U,V|W=1∣∣∣∣∣∣TV
(c)
= EBn
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnS0,S − Γ(Bn)S0,S|W=1∣∣∣∣∣∣TV (41)
where:
(a) is because Γ(Bn)(w) = P (Bn)(w) = 2−nR˜, for every w ∈ W and Bn, and since Bn is independent of W ;
(b) uses the symmetry of the codebook construction with respect to W ;
(c) is by (39) and because P (Bn)S0,S = QnS0,S for every Bn.
Invoking [25, Corollary VII.5] once more yields
EBn
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnS0,S − Γ(Bn)S0,S|W=1∣∣∣∣∣∣TV −−−−→n→∞ 0 (42)
exponentially fast, as long as
R′ > I(U ;S|S0). (43)
This implies that there exists c > 0 such that
EBn
∣∣∣∣∣∣P (Bn)S0,S,V −QnS0,S,V ∣∣∣∣∣∣TV ≤ e−cn. (44)
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B. Proof of Lemma 2
The proof uses the following property of the TV (see, e.g., [28, Property 1]): Let µ, ν be two measures on a
measurable space (X ,F) and g : X → R be a measurable function bounded by b ∈ R. It holds that
∣∣Eµg − Eνg∣∣ ≤ b · ∣∣∣∣µ− ν∣∣∣∣TV (45)
Fix ǫ > 0 and consider the Γ PMF defined in (36). With respect to the random experiment described by Γ, we
have
EBnPΓ(Bn)
((
S0,S,U(S0, w, I,Bn)
)
/∈ T nǫ (QS0,S,U )
)
−−−−→
n→∞
0 (46)
because U(S0, w, i,Bn) ∼ QnU|S0 , for every i ∈ I, and S is obtained by feeding (S0,U(S0, w, i,Bn)
)
into a DMC
QnS|U,S0 . Thus, (46) holds by the law of large numbers (LLN). Further, basic properties of the TV and the analysis
in Section VII-A (see (41)) imply
EBn
∣∣∣∣∣∣P (Bn)S0,S,U − Γ(Bn)S0,S,U∣∣∣∣∣∣TV ≤ EBn
∣∣∣∣∣∣P (Bn)S0,S,W,I,U,V − Γ(Bn)S0,S,W,I,U,V∣∣∣∣∣∣TV −−−−→n→∞ 0. (47)
Now, let gn : Sn0 × Sn × Un → R be defined by gn(s0, s,u) , 1{(s0,s,u)/∈T nǫ (QS0,S,U )} and consider
EBnPP (Bn)
((
S0,S,U(S0, w, I,Bn)
)
/∈ T nǫ (QS0,S,U)
)
= EBnEP (Bn)
[
gn
(
S0,S,U(S0, w, I,Bn)
)]
≤ EBnEΓ(Bn)
[
gn
(
S0,S,U(S0, w, I,Bn)
)]
+ EBn
∣∣∣∣EP (Bn)[gn(S0,S,U(S0, w, I,Bn))]− EΓ(Bn)[gn(S0,S,U(S0, w, I,Bn))]
∣∣∣∣
(a)
≤ EBnPΓ(Bn)
((
S0,S,U(S0, w, I,Bn)
)
/∈ T nǫ (QS0,S,U)
)
+ EBn
∣∣∣∣∣∣P (Bn)S0,S,U − Γ(Bn)S0,S,U∣∣∣∣∣∣TV (48)
where (a) uses (45) and the fact that gn is bounded by b = 1, for any n ∈ N. By (46)-(47), the RHS of (48)
approaches 0 as n→∞.
C. Proof of Theorem 1
Fix a PMF QU0,U1,U2,X ∈ P(U0 ×U1 ×U2 ×X ) and ǫ > 0. Let QU0,U1,U2,X,Y1,Y2 , QU0,U1,U2,XQY1,Y2|X and
consider the following scheme.
Preliminaries: Split each m2 ∈ M2 into two sub-messages denoted by (m20,m22). The pair mp , (m0,m20)
is referred to as a public message and is to be decoded by both receivers, while m1 and m22, that serve as private
messages, are to be decoded by receiver 1 and receiver 2, respectively. The cooperation protocol will use the link
to convey information about the decoded mp from receiver 1 to receiver 2. The rates associated with m20 and m22
are denoted by R20 and R22, while the corresponding alphabets are M20 and M22, respectively. Furthermore, we
use Rp , R0 + R20 and Mp , M0 ×M20. Since |Mp| = 2nRp , with some abuse of notation, we also use
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Mp =
[
1 : 2nRp
]
. The partial rates R20 and R22 satisfy
R2 = R20 +R22. (49)
With respect to the above, the random variable M2 is split into two independent random variables M20 and M22
that are uniform over M20 and M22, respectively. The random variable Mp , (M0,M20) is uniformly distributed
over Mp. Partition Mp into 2nR12 equal-sized subsets (referred to as “bins”) B12(m12), where m12 ∈ M12.
The function mˆ12 : Mp → M12 associates with each public message mp ∈ Mp its bin index mˆ12(mp), i.e.,
mp ∈ B12
(
mˆ12(mp)
)
, for each mp ∈ Mp. Moreover, let W be a random variable uniformly distributed over
W =
[
1 : 2nR˜
]
and independent of (M0,M1,M2) (W is therefore also independent of (Mp,M1,M22)).
Codebook Bn: Most of the subsequent notations for codebooks and codewords omit the blocklength n. Let
B0 ,
{
U0(mp)
}
mp∈Mp
be a random public message codebook that comprises 2nRp i.i.d. random vectors U0(mp),
each distributed according to QnU0 . A realization of B0 is denoted by B0 ,
{
u0(mp,B0)
}
mp∈Mp
.
Fix a public message codebook B0. For every mp ∈ Mp, let B1(mp) ,
{
U1(mp,m1, w, i)
}
(m1,w,i)∈M1×W×I
,
where I ,
[
1 : 2nR
′
1
]
, be a random codebook of the confidential messages to User 1, that consists of conditionally
independent random vectors each distributed according to QnU1|U0=u0(mp,B0). Similarly, for each mp ∈ Mp, the
corresponding random codebook of private message 2 is B2(mp) ,
{
U2(mp,m22)
}
m22∈M22
, and comprises
2nR22 conditionally independent random vectors distributed according to QnU2|U0=u0(mp,B0). For j = 1, 2,, we set
Bj =
{
Bj(mp)
}
mp∈Mp
, and denote a realization of Bj by Bj . We also define B0,j =
{
B0,Bj
}
, for j = 1, 2,
and Bn =
{
B0,B1,B2
}
. For each mp ∈ Mp, realizations of B1(mp) and B2(mp) are denoted by B1(mp) ,{
u1(mp,m1, w, i,B0,1)
}
(m1,w,i)∈M1×W×I
and B2(mp) ,
{
u2(mp,m22,B0,2)
}
m22∈M22
, respectively. Based on
the labeling in B1(mp), it can be though of as having a u1-bin associated with every pair (m1, w) ∈ M1 ×W ,
each containing 2nR′1 uj-codewords.
Denote the set of all possible codebooks of the above structure by Bn. The above construction induces a PMF
µn ∈ P(Bn) that associates with every codebook Bn =
{
B0,B1,B2
}
∈ Bn a probability given by
µn(Bn) =
∏
mp∈Mp
QnU0
(
u0(mp,B0)
) ∏
(m(1)p ,m1,w,i)
∈Mp×M1×W×I
QnU1|U0
(
u1
(
m(1)p ,m1, w, i,B0,1
)∣∣∣u0(m(1)p ,B0))
×
∏
(m
(2)
p ,m22)∈Mp×M22
QnU2|U0
(
u2
(
m(2)p ,m22,B0,2
)∣∣∣u0(m(2)p ,B0)). (50)
For a fixed codebook Bn ∈ Bn we next describe its associated encoding function f (Bn), cooperation function
g
(Bn)
12 and decoding functions φ
(Bn)
j , for j = 1, 2.
Encoder f (Bn): To transmit a triple (m0,m1,m2) ∈ M0×M1×M2, the encoder transforms it into the triple
(mp,m1,m22) ∈ Mp ×M1 ×M22, and draws W uniformly over W . Then, an index i ∈ I is chosen by a
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Fig. 10: Codebook structure.
likelihood encoder, i.e., according to the PMF
Pˆ
(Bn)
BC
(
i
∣∣w,u0(mp,B0),u2(mp,m22,B0,2))
=
QnU2|U1,U0
(
u2(mp,m22,B0,2)
∣∣u1(mp,m1, w, i,B0,1),u0(mp,B0))∑
i′∈I Q
n
U2|U1,U0
(
u2(mp,m22,B0,2)
∣∣u1(mp,m1, w, i′,B0,1),u0(mp,B0)) . (51)
Finally, the channel input sequence is generated according to the conditional product distribution
QnX|U0=u0(mp,B0),U1=u1(mp,m1,w,i,B0,1),U2=u2(mp,m22,B0,2) and is transmitted over the BC.
Decoding and Cooperation: For any codebook Bn ∈ Bn, we define the following:
• Decoder 1 - φ(Bn)1 : Searches for a unique triple (mˆp, mˆ1, wˆ) ∈Mp×M1×W , for which there is an index
iˆ ∈ I such that (
u0(mˆp,B0),u1(mˆp, mˆ1, wˆ, iˆ,B0,1),y1
)
∈ T nǫ (QU0,U1,Y1). (52)
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If such a unique triple is found set φ(Bn)1 (y1) = (mˆ0, mˆ1), where mˆ0 is taken from mˆp = (mˆ0, mˆ22);
otherwise, set φ(Bn)1 (y1) = 1.
• Cooperation g(Bn)12 : Having (mˆp, mˆ1, wˆ, iˆ), Decoder 1 conveys the bin number of mˆp, i.e., mˆ12(mˆp) ∈M12,
to Decoder 2 via the cooperation link. That is, g(Bn)12 (y1) = mˆ12(mˆp), where mˆp is defined by φ
(Bn)
1 (y1)
from the previous stage.
• Decoder 2 - φ(Bn)2 : Having
(
mˆ12(mˆp),y2
)
, Decoder 2 searches for a unique pair ( ˆˆmp, ˆˆm22) ∈ Mp ×M22,
such that (
u0( ˆˆmp,B0),u2( ˆˆmp, ˆˆm22,B0,2),y2
)
∈ T nǫ (QU0,U2,Y2) (53)
where ˆˆmp ∈ S
(
mˆ12(mˆp)
)
. If such a unique pair is found, set φ(Bn)2
(
mˆ12(mˆp),y2
)
=
(
ˆˆm0, ˆˆm2
)
, where ˆˆm2 =
( ˆˆm20, ˆˆm22) in which ˆˆm0 and ˆˆm20 are specified by ˆˆmp =
(
ˆˆm0, ˆˆm20
)
; otherwise, set φ(Bn)2
(
mˆ12(mˆp),y2
)
= 1.
The tuple
(
f (Bn), g
(Bn)
12 , φ
(Bn)
1 , φ
(Bn)
2
)
defined with respect to a codebook Bn ∈ Bn constitutes an
(n,R12, R0, R1, R2) code cn for the cooperative BC. When a random codebook Bn is used, we denote the
corresponding random code by Cn. For any fixed Bn (which, in turn, fixes cn), the induced joint distribution
is
P (Bn)
(
mp,m1,m22, w,m12,u0,u2, i,u1,x,y1,y2,
(
mˆ
(1)
0 , mˆ1
)
,
(
mˆ
(2)
0 , mˆ2
))
= 2−n(Rp+R1+R22+R˜)1{
m12=mˆ12(mp)
}
∩
{
u0=u0(mp,B0)
}
∩
{
u2=u2(mp,m22,B0,2)
}
× Pˆ
(Bn)
BC
(
i
∣∣w,u0(mp,B0),u2(mp,m22,B0,2))1{
u1=u1(mp,m1,w,i,B0,1)
}QnX|U0,U1,U2(x|u0,u1,u2)
×QnY1,Y2|X(y1,y2|x)1
{(
mˆ
(1)
0 ,mˆ1
)
=φ
(Bn)
1 (y1)
}
∩
{(
mˆ
(2)
0 ,mˆ2
)
=φ
(Bn)
2 (m12,y2)
}. (54)
The error probability analysis is given in Appendix D and uses Lemma 2 to first show that the above encoding
process results in u0-, u1- and u2-sequences that are jointly typical. Then, by standard joint-typicality decoding
arguments, reliability follows provided that
R′ > I(U1;U2|U0) (55a)
R′ + R˜ > I(U1;U2, Y2|U0) (55b)
R1 + R˜+R
′ < I(U1;Y1|U0) (55c)
R0 +R20 +R1 + R˜+R
′ < I(U0, U1;Y1) (55d)
R22 < I(U2;Y2|U0) (55e)
R0 +R2 −R12 < I(U0, U2;Y2). (55f)
Security Analysis: In the following analysis we sometimes omit the functional dependencies of the uj-codewords,
j = 0, 1, 2, on the corresponding indices and codebooks when it is clear from the context. For example, we write
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U2 instead of U2(Mp,M22,B0,2). Fix a codebook Bn and consider the following upper bound on the information
leakage L(cn) 5
I(M1;M12,Y2) ≤ I(M1;M12,Mp,M22,Y2)
(a)
= I
(
M1;Y2|Mp,M22,U0(Mp,B0),U2(Mp,M22,B0,2)
)
(b)
= D
(
P
(Bn)
Y2|Mp,M1,M22,U0,U2
∣∣∣∣∣∣P (Bn)Y2|Mp,M22,U0,U2∣∣∣P (Bn)Mp,M1,M22,U0,U2)
(c)
≤ D
(
P
(Bn)
Y2|Mp,M1,M22,U0,U2
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnY2|U0,U2∣∣∣P (Bn)Mp,M1,M22,U0,U2) (56)
where:
(a) is because M1 is independent of (Mp,M22), and since M12 = mˆ12(Mp), U0(Mp,B0) and U2(Mp,M22,B0,2)
are defined by (Mp,M22);
(b) uses the relative entropy chain rule and the independence of M1 and(
Mp,M22,U0(Mp,B0),U2(Mp,M22,B0,2)
)
;
(c) is since for every Bn ∈ Bn, we have
D
(
P
(Bn)
Y2|Mp,M1,M22,U0,U2
∣∣∣∣∣∣P (Bn)Y2|Mp,M22,U0,U2∣∣∣P (Bn)Mp,M1,M22,U0,U2)
=
∑
mp,m1,m22,u0,u2,y2
P (Bn)(mp,m1,m22,u0,u2,y2)
× log
(
P (Bn)(y2|mp,m1,m22,u0,u2)
P (Bn)(y2|m22,u0,u2)
·
QnY2|U0,U2(y2|u0,u2)
QnY2|U0,U2(y2|u0,u2)
)
= D
(
P
(Bn)
Y2|Mp,M1,M22,U0,U2
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnY2|U0,U2∣∣∣P (Bn)Mp,M1,M22,U0,U2)
+
∑
mp,m1,m22,u0,u2,y2
P (Bn)(mp,m1,m22,u0,u2,y2) log
(
QnY2|U0,U2(y2|u0,u2)
P (Bn)(y2|mp,m22,u0,u2)
)
= D
(
P
(Bn)
Y2|Mp,M1,M22,U0,U2
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnY2|U0,U2∣∣∣P (Bn)Mp,M1,M22,U0,U2)
−D
(
P
(Bn)
Y2|Mp,M22,U0,U2
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnY2|U0,U2∣∣∣P (Bn)Mp,M22,U0,U2).
By (56), to satisfy (14b) it suffices to show that there is a sufficiently large n for which
D
(
P
(Bn)
Y2|Mp,M1,M22,U0,U2
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnY2|U0,U2 ∣∣∣P (Bn)Mp,M1,M22,U0,U2) ≤ ǫ. (57)
Taking the expectation of the RHS of (56) over the ensemble of codebooks, we have
EBnD
(
P
(Bn)
Y2|Mp,M1,M22,U0,U2
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnY2|U0,U2 ∣∣∣P (Bn)Mp,M1,M22,U0,U2)
5All subsequent multi-letter mutual information terms are calculated with respect to (54).
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= EBn
[ ∑
mp,m1,m22,u0,u2
2−n(Rp+R1+R22)1{(
U0(mp),U2(mp,m22)
)
=(u0,u2)
}
×D
(
P
(Bn)
Y2|Mp=mp,M1=m1,M22=m22,U0=u0,U2=u2
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnY2|U0=u0,U2=u2)
]
(a)
=
∑
u0,u2
EBn
[
1{(
U0(1),U2(1,1)
)
=(u0,u2)
}
×D
(
P
(Bn)
Y2|Mp=1,M1=1,M22=1,U0=u0,U2=u2
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnY2|U0=u0,U2=u2)
]
(b)
=
∑
u0,u2
EB0,2
[
EB1|B0,2
[
1{(
U0(1),U2(1,1)
)
=(u0,u2)
}
×D
(
P
(Bn)
Y2|Mp=1,M1=1,M22=1,U0=u0,U2=u2
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnY2|U0=u0,U2=u2)
∣∣∣∣B0,2
]]
(c)
=
∑
u0,u2
EB0,2
[
1{(
U0(1),U2(1,1)
)
=(u0,u2)
}
× EB1|B0,2
[
D
(
P
(Bn)
Y2|Mp=1,M1=1,M22=1,U0=u0,U2=u2
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnY2|U0=u0,U2=u2)
∣∣∣∣B0,2
]]
(58)
where:
(a) uses the symmetry of the codebook with respect to the messages;
(b) is the law of total expectation (conditioning the inner expectation on B0,2 ,
{
B0,B2
});
(c) follows because conditioning on (B0,B2) fixes the indicator function.
Next, we adjust the RHS of (58) so that it corresponds to the setup of Lemma 1. To this end, note that when Bn ∈
Bn is fixed, P (Bn)Y2|Mp=1,M1=1,M22=1,U0=u0,U2=u2 is well-defined only if u0 = u0(1,B0) and u2 = u2(1, 1,B0,2).
For any other u0 and u2, we may set this conditional distribution as any arbitrary PMF on Yn2 , since this does not
affect the joint distribution from (54). Accordingly, if u0 6= u0(1,B0) or u2 6= u2(1, 1,B0,2), we define
P
(Bn)
Y2|Mp=1,M1=1,M22=1,U0=u0,U2=u2
= QnY2|U0=u0,U2=u2 . (59)
Having this, note that for any (u0,u2) ∈ Un0 × Un2 and a fixed B0,2 = B0,2, we have
EB1|B0,2
[
D
(
P
(Bn)
Y2|Mp=1,M1=1,M22=1,U0=u0,U2=u2
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnY2|U0=u0,U2=u2)
∣∣∣∣B0,2 = B0,2
]
= EB1|B0,2
[
1{(
u0(1,B0),u2(1,1,B0,2)
)
=(u0,u2)
}D(P (Bn)Y2|Mp=1,M1=1,M22=1,U0=u0,U2=u2∣∣∣∣∣∣QnY2|U0=u0,U2=u2)
+ 1{(
u0(1,B0),u2(1,1,B0,2)
)
6=(u0,u2)
}D(P (Bn)Y2|Mp=1,M1=1,M22=1,U0=u0,U2=u2∣∣∣∣∣∣QnY2|U0=u0,U2=u2)
∣∣∣∣B0,2 = B0,2
]
(a)
= EB1|U0,U2
[
1{(
u0(1,B0),u2(1,1,B0,2)
)
=(u0,u2)
}
×D
(
P
(B1(1))
Y2|Mp=1,M1=1,M22=1,U0=u0,U2=u2
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnY2|U0=u0,U2=u2)
∣∣∣∣U0(1) = u0(1,B0),U2(1, 1) = u2(1, 1,B0,2)
]
(60)
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where (a) follows from (59) and because conditioned on U0(1), P (Bn)Y2|Mp=1,M1=1,M22=1,U0=u0,U2=u2 is independent
of all the other codewords in B0,2; the indicator function, on the other hand, depends also on U2(1, 1). Furthermore,
P
(Bn)
Y2|Mp=1,M1=1,M22=1,U0=u0,U2=u2
is actually a function of the sub-codebook B1(1), rather than the entire
collection Bn. To highlight this observation we replace the superscript Bn of the conditional PMF of interest
with B1(1).
Some further definitions are due in order to rigorously justify the application of Lemma 1. For each u0 ∈ Un0 , let
B˜(u0) ,
{
U˜1(u0, w, i)
}
(w,i)∈W×I
, be a collection of i.i.d. random vectors of length n, each distributed according
to QnU1|U0=u0 . The collection B˜n ,
{
B˜(u0)
}
u0∈Un0
is independent of Bn =
{
B0,B1,B2
}
. As before, we denote by
B˜(u0) ,
{
u˜1(u0, w, i, B˜n)
}
(w,i)∈W×I
a realization of B˜(u0). For each (u0,u2) ∈ Un0 ×Un2 and the corresponding
B˜(u0), we define the conditional PMF
P˜ (B˜n)(w, i, u˜1,y2|u0,u2) = 2
−nR˜P˜ (B˜n)(i|w,u0,u2)1{
u˜1(u0,w,i,B˜n)=u˜1
}QnY2|U0,U1,U2(y2|u0, u˜1,u2), (61)
where P˜ (B˜n)(i|w,u0,u2) is defined exactly like Pˆ (Bn)(i|w, s0, s) from (7), up to renaming s0, s, u and Bn therein
to u0, u2, u˜1 and B˜n, respectively, in the above. With that, for any (u0,u2) ∈ Un0 ×Un2 and B0,2 = B0,1, we upper
bound the RHS of (60) as
EB1|U0,U2
[
1{(
u0(1,B0),u2(1,1,B0,2)
)
=(u0,u2)
}
×D
(
P
(B1(1))
Y2|Mp=1,M1=1,M22=1,U0=u0,U2=u2
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnY2|U0=u0,U2=u2)
∣∣∣∣U0(1) = u0(1,B0),U2(1, 1) = u2(1, 1,B0,2)
]
= E
B˜n|U0,U2
[
1{(
u0(1,B0),u2(1,1,B0,2)
)
=(u0,u2)
}
×D
(
P˜
(B˜n)
Y2|U0=u0,U2=u2
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnY2|U0=u0,U2=u2)
∣∣∣∣U0(1) = u0(1,B0),U2(1, 1) = u2(1, 1,B0,2)
]
(a)
≤ E
B˜n
D
(
P˜
(B˜n)
Y2|U0=u0,U2=u2
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnY2|U0=u0,U2=u2) (62)
where (a) upper bounds the indicator function by 1 and uses the independence of B˜n and Bn. The RHS of (62) falls
within the framework of Lemma 1 and can, therefore, be made arbitrarily small provided that (55a)-(55b) hold.
Inserting (62) back into (58), yields
EBnD
(
P
(Bn)
Y2|Mp,M1,M22,U0,U2
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnY2|U0,U2∣∣∣P (Bn)Mp,M1,M22,U0,U2)
≤
∑
u0,u2
EB0,21
{(
U0(1,B0),U2(1,1,B0,2)
)
=(u0,u2)
}E
B˜n
D
(
P˜
(B˜n)
Y2|U0=u0,U2=u2
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnY2|U0=u0,U2=u2)
(a)
= E
B˜n
∑
u0,u2
QnU0,U2(u0,u2)D
(
P˜
(B˜n)
Y2|U0=u0,U2=u2
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnY2|U0=u0,U2=u2)
= E
B˜n
(
P˜
(B˜n)
Y2|U0,U2
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnY2|U0,U2 ∣∣∣QnU0,U2) (63)
where (a) is since QU0,U2 is the coding PMF, which gives Pµ
(
U0(1) = u0,U2(1, 1) = u2
)
= QnU0,U2(u0,u2).
Invoking Lemma 1 on the RHS of (63), while viewing QY2|U0,U1,U2 as a state-dependent DMC from U1 to Y2 with
28
TABLE I: Correspondence between coding scheme for the cooperative BC and the setup of the resolvability
Lemma 1.
Cooperative BC Code Resolvability Lemma
State-dependent DMC QY2|U0,U1,U2 QV |U,S0,S
Channel’s states (U0,U2) (S0,S)
Channel’s input U1 U
Resolvability Codebook
{
U1(mp,m1, w, i)
}(2nR˜,2nR′)
(w,i)=(1,1)
,
{
U(s0, w, i)
}(2nR˜,2nR′)
(w,i)=(1,1)
for each (mp,m1) ∈ Mp ×M1
Codebook generation ∼ QnU1|U0=u(mp) ∼ Q
n
U|S0=s0
Likelihood encoder Pˆ (Bn)BC (i|w,u0,u2) from (51) - Pˆ (Bn)(i|w, s0, s) from (7) -
Correlates (U0,U1) with U2 Correlates (S0,U) with S2
Rate bounds R′ > I(U1;U2|U0) R′ > I(U ;S|S0)
R′ + R˜ > I(U1;U2, Y2|U0) R′ + R˜ > I(U ;S, V |S0)
Implied asymptotic EBnI(M1;M12Y2)→ 0 EBnD
(
P
(Bn)
V|S0,S
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnV |S0,S∣∣∣QnS0,S)→ 0
behaviour as n→∞ as n→∞
state space U0 × U2, we have that the rate bounds in (55a)-(55b) imply
E
B˜n
(
P˜
(B˜n)
Y2|U0,U2
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnY2|U0,U2 ∣∣∣QnU0,U2) −−−−→n→∞ 0. (64)
By combining (56), (58), (60) and (62)-(64), we deduce that EBnL(Cn)→ 0, as n→∞.
The Selection Lemma [50, Lemma 5] (see also [19, Lemma 2.2]) applied to the sequence of random variables{
Cn
}
n∈N
and the functions Pe and L implies the existence of a sequence of realizations
{
cn
}
n∈N
, for which
Pe(cn) ≤ ǫ and L(cn) ≤ ǫ, for n sufficiently large. Finally, we apply Fourier-Motzkin elimination (FME) on (55)
while using (49) and the non-negativity of the involved terms, to eliminate R20, R′ and R˜. Since the above linear
inequalities have constant coefficients, the FME can be performed by a computer program, e.g., by the FME-IT
algorithm [51]. This establishes (15) as an inner bound.
Remark 6 (Analogy Between BC Code and Resolvability Lemma) Lemma 1 is key in the security analysis of
the proposed coding scheme for the cooperative BC. In the following, we relate the BC code construction and the
setup of our resolvability lemma. Having (56), the main idea is to adjust the relative entropy on the RHS so that it
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corresponds to the lemma. This is done by viewing the u0- and the u2-codewords from the BC codebook as a pair of
states of the subchannel QY2|U0,U1,U2 to Decoder 2, where the u1-codewords plays the role of the channel’s input.
The validity of this analogy stems from the structure of the BC codebook, where for each (mp,m1) ∈Mp×M1, the
set
{
U1(mp,m1, w, i)
}
(w,i)∈W×I
forms a resolvability codebook just like in Lemma 1. This resolvability codebook
is superimposed on U0(mp), while the transmitted u1-codeword is correlated with U2(mp,m22), m22 ∈ M22,
by means of the likelihood encoder (51). The correspondence between the coding scheme presented in this section
and the setup of Lemma 1 is summarized in Table I. The main challenge in applying Lemma 1 to get strong
secrecy for the cooperative BC is to account for the relative entropy from the RHS of (56) being conditioned on the
joint distribution of U0 and U2 that is induced by the code, while in the lemma the conditioning is on a product
distribution. However, as the derivation between Equation (56)-(64) shows, under the expectation over the ensemble
of codebooks, the induced distribution in the conditioning can be converted to the QnU0,U2 according to which the
codebooks U0 and U2 are drawn.
Remark 7 (Comparison to the Scheme without Secrecy) The main differences between the coding schemes for
the cooperative BC with one confidential message and the same channel without secrecy [35] are threefold. First,
a randomizer W is used in the secrecy-achieving scheme. Second, the cooperation message M12 depends on M20
rather than on the pair (M10,M20) (M10 refers to the public part of the message M1). Note that conveying an
M12 that holds any part of M1 (in the form of its public part M10) violates the secrecy requirement. Finally, a
prefix channel QX|U0,U1,U2 is used to optimize randomness and, in turn, to conceal M1 from the 2nd receiver.
D. Converse Proof for Theorem 2
We show that if a rate tuple (R12, R0, R1, R2) is achievable, then there exists a PMF QW,V,Y1,X with Y1 = g(X),
such that the inequalities in (17) are satisfied. Fix an achievable tuple (R12, R0, R1, R2) and an ǫ > 0, and
let cn be the corresponding (n,R12, R0, R1, R2) code for some sufficiently large n ∈ N. All subsequent multi-
letter information measures are calculated with respect to the PMF induced by cn from (12), with the SD-BC
QnY1,Y2|X(y1,y2|x) = 1⋂n
i=1
{
y1,i=g(xi)
}QnY2|X(y2|x). By Fano’s inequality we have
H(M0,M1|Y
n
1 ) ≤ 1 + nǫ(R0 +R1) , nǫ
(1)
n (65a)
H(M0,M2|M12, Y
n
2 ) ≤ 1 + nǫ(R0 +R2) , nǫ
(2)
n . (65b)
Define
ǫn = max
{
ǫ(1)n , ǫ
(2)
n
}
. (65c)
Moreover, by (14b), we write
ǫ ≥ I(M1;M12, Y
n
2 )
= I(M1;M0,M2,M12, Y
n
2 )− I(M1;M0,M2|M12, Y
n
2 )
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(a)
≥ I(M1;M12, Y
n
2 |M0,M2)−H(M0,M2|M12, Y
n
2 )
(b)
≥ I(M1;M12, Y
n
2 |M0,M2)− nǫn (66)
where (a) uses the independence of M1 and (M0,M2) and the non-negativity of entropy, while (b) follows from
(65). Thus,
I(M1;M12, Y
n
2 |M0,M2) ≤ ǫ+ nǫn. (67)
It follows that
nR1 = H(M1)
(a)
= H(M1|M12,M0,M2) + I(M1;M12|M0,M2)
(b)
≤ I(M1;Y
n
1 |M12,M0,M2) + I(M1;M12|M0,M2)− I(M1;M12, Y
n
2 |M0,M2) + nδ
(1)
n
(c)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(M1;Y
i
1 , Y
n
2,i+1|M12,M0,M2)− I(M1;Y
i−1
1 , Y
n
2,i|M12,M0,M2)
]
+ nδ(1)n
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(M1;Y1,i|M12,M0,M2, Y
i−1
1 , Y
n
2,i+1)− I(M1;Y2,i|M12,M0,M2, Y
i−1
1 , Y
n
2,i+1)
]
+ nδ(1)n
(d)
=
n∑
i=1
[
H(Y1,i|M2,Wi)−H(Y1,i|M1,M2,Wi)− I(M1;Y2,i|M2,Wi)
]
+ nδ(1)n
≤
n∑
i=1
[
H(Y1,i|M2,Wi)− I(Y1,i;Y2,i|M1,M2,Wi)− I(M1;Y2,i|M2,Wi)
]
+ nδ(1)n
=
n∑
i=1
[
H(Y1,i|M2,Wi)− I(M1, Y1,i;Y2,i|M1,M2,Wi)
]
+ nδ(1)n
≤
n∑
i=1
H(Y1,i|M2,Wi, Y2,i) + nδ
(1)
n (68)
where:
(a) is because M1 is independent (M0,M2);
(b) follows from (65)-(66) and by denoting δ(1)n = 2ǫn + ǫn ;
(c) is a telescoping identity [52, Eqs. (9) and (11)];
(d) is by defining Wi = (M12,M0, Y i−11 , Y n2,i+1).
The common message rate R0 satisfies
nR0 = H(M0)
(a)
≤ I(M0;Y
n
1 ) + nǫn (69a)
=
n∑
i=1
I(M0;Y1,i|Y
i−1
1 ) + nǫn
31
≤
n∑
i=1
I(M0, Y
i−1
1 ;Y1,i) + nǫn
(b)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(Wi;Y1,i) + nǫn (69b)
where (a) uses (65) and (b) follows by the definition of Wi. Combining (68) with (69b) yields
n(R0 +R1) ≤
n∑
i=1
[
H(Y1,i|M2,Wi, Y2,i) + I(Wi;Y1,i)
]
+ nδ(2)n (70)
where δ(2)n = δ(1)n + ǫn.
For the sum R0 +R2, we have
n(R0 +R2) = H(M0,M2)
(a)
≤ I(M0,M2;M12, Y
n
2 ) + nǫn
= I(M0,M2;Y
n
2 |M12) + I(M0,M2;M12) + nǫn
(b)
≤ I(M0,M2;Y
n
2 |M12) + nR12 + nǫn
=
n∑
i=1
I(M0,M2;Y2,i|M12, Y
n
2,i+1) + nR12 + nǫn
(c)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(M2,Wi;Y2,i) + nR12 + nǫn (71)
where:
(a) uses (65);
(b) is by the non-negativity of entropy and since a uniform distribution maximizes entropy;
(c) follows from the definition of Wi and because conditioning cannot increase entropy.
To bound R0 +R1 +R2, we begin by writing
n(R0 +R1 +R2) = H(M0,M1,M2) = H(M1|M0,M2) +H(M2|M0) +H(M0). (72)
Consider
H(M2|M0)
(a)
≤ I(M2;Y
n
2 |M12,M0) + I(M2;M12|M0) + nǫn
(b)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(M2;Y
n
2,i|M12,M0, Y
i−1
1 )− I(M2;Y
n
2,i+1|M12,M0, Y
i
1 )
]
+ I(M2;M12|M0) + nǫn
(c)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(M2;Y
n
2,i+1|M12,M0, Y
i−1
1 ) + I(M2;Y2,i|Wi)− I(M2;Y1,i, Y
n
2,i+1|M12,M0, Y
i−1
1 )
+ I(M2;Y1,i|M12,M0, Y
i−1
1 )
]
+ I(M2;M12|M0) + nǫn
(d)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(M2;Y2,i|Wi)− I(M2;Y1,i|Wi)
]
+ I(M2;Y
n
1 |M0) + nǫn (73)
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where:
(a) is by (65) and by the mutual information chain rule;
(b) is a telescoping identity;
(c) follows from the definition of Wi;
(d) is due to the mutual information chain rule and the definition of Wi (second term), and because M12 is defined
by Y n1 (third term).
Combining (69a) with (73), yields
n(R0 +R2) ≤
n∑
i=1
[
I(M2;Y2,i|Wi)− I(M2;Y1,i|Wi)
]
+ I(M0,M2;Y
n
1 ) + 2nǫn
(a)
≤
n∑
i=1
[
I(M2;Y2,i|Wi)− I(M2;Y1,i|Wi) +H(Y1,i)−H(Y1,i|M0,M2, Y
i−1
1 )
]
+ 2nǫn
(b)
≤
n∑
i=1
[
I(M2;Y2,i|Wi) + I(Wi;Y1,i)− I(M12, Y
n
2,i+1;Y1,i|M0,M2, Y
i−1
1 )
]
+ 2nǫn
(c)
≤
n∑
i=1
[
I(M2;Y2,i|Wi) + I(Wi;Y1,i)
]
+ 2nǫn (74)
where:
(a) is because conditioning cannot increase entropy;
(b) uses the definition of Wi;
(c) is by the non-negativity of mutual information.
By inserting (68) and (74) into (72), we bound the sum of rates as
n(R0 +R1 +R2) ≤
n∑
i=1
[
H(Y1,i|M2,Wi, Y2,i) + I(M2;Y2,i|Wi) + I(Wi;Y1,i)
]
+ nδ(3)n (75)
where δ(3)n = δ(1)n + 2ǫn.
The bounds in (68), (70), (71) and (74) are rewritten by introducing a time-sharing random variable T that is
uniformly distributed over the set [1 : n] and is independent of (M0,M1,M2, Xn, Y n1 , Y n2 ). For instance, (68) is
rewritten as
R1 ≤
1
n
n∑
t=1
H(Y1,t|M2,Wt, Y2,t) + δ
(1)
n
=
n∑
t=1
P
(
T = t
)
H(Y1,T |M2,WT , Y2,T , T = t) + δ
(1)
n
= H(Y1,T |M2,WT , Y2,T , T ) + δ
(1)
n (76)
Denote W , (WT , T ), V , (M2,W ), X , XT , Y1 , Y1,T and Y2 , Y2,T . This results in the bounds (17)
with small added terms such as ǫn and δ(1)n . For large n, we can make these terms approach 0. The converse
is completed by showing the PMF of (W,V,X, Y1, Y2) factors as QW,V,Y1,XQY2|X and satisfies Y1 = g(X). As
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functional relation between Y1 and X is straightforward, it remains to be shown that
(W,V, Y1)−X − Y2 (77)
forms a Markov chain. This is proven in Appendix E-A.
E. Converse Proof for Theorem 3
We show that given an achievable rate tuple (R12, R0, R1, R2), there is a PMF QW,XQY1|XQY2|Y1 for which (18)
holds. Let be (R12, R0, R1, R2) an achievable tuple and fix ǫ > 0. Let cn be the corresponding (n,R12, R0, R1, R2)
code for some sufficiently large n ∈ N. The induced joint distribution is again given by (12), but now the transition
matrix is of a PD-BC, i.e., QnY1,Y2|X(y1,y2|x) = Q
n
Y1|X
(y1|x)QnY2|Y1(y2|y1). Fano’s inequality gives
H(M0,M1|Y
n
1 ) ≤ 1 + nǫ(R0 +R1) , nκ
(1)
n (78a)
H(M0,M2|M12, Y
n
2 ) ≤ 1 + nǫ(R0 +R2) , nκ
(2)
n (78b)
H(M0,M1,M2|Y
n
1 , Y
n
2 ) ≤ 1 + nǫ(R0 +R1 +R2) , nκ
(3)
n (78c)
and we set
κn = max
{
κ(1)n , κ
(2)
n , κ
(3)
n
}
= κ(3)n . (78d)
Further, by the strong secrecy constraint (14b), we have
ǫ ≥ I(M1;M12, Y
n
2 )
= I(M1;M0,M2,M12, Y
n
2 )− I(M1;M0,M2|M12, Y
n
2 )
(a)
≥ I(M1;M12, Y
n
2 |M0,M2)−H(M0,M2|M12, Y
n
2 )
(b)
≥ I(M1;Y
n
2 |M0,M2)− nκn (79)
where (a) uses the independence of M1 and (M0,M2) and the non-negativity of entropy, while (b) is by (78) and
since conditioning cannot increase entropy. This yields
I(M1;Y
n
2 |M0,M2) ≤ ǫ+ nκn. (80)
We bound
nR1 = H(M1)
(a)
= H(M1|M0,M2)
(b)
≤ I(M1;Y
n
1 |M0,M2)− I(M1;Y
n
2 |M0,M2) + nηn
(c)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(M1;Y
i
1 , Y
n
2,i+1|M0,M2)− I(M1;Y
i−1
1 , Y
n
2,i|M0,M2)
]
+ nηn
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(d)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(M1;Y1,i|Wi)− I(M1;Y2,i|Wi)
]
+ nηn (81a)
(e)
=
n∑
i=1
I(M1;Y1,i|Wi, Y2,i) + nηn
(f)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Y1,i|Wi, Y2,i) + nηn
(g)
≤
n∑
i=1
[
I(Xi;Y1,i|Wi)− I(Xi;Y2,i|Wi)
]
+ nηn (81b)
where:
(a) uses the independence of M1 and (M0,M2);
(b) is by (78) and (79), and by denoting ηn = 2κn + ǫn ;
(c) is a telescoping identity;
(d) follows by defining Wi , (M0,M2, Y i−11 , Y n2,i+1);
(e) and (g) rely on the mutual information chain rule and the PD property of the channel, which implies that
(M1, Xi)− (Wi, Y1,i)− Y2,i forms a Markov chain for all i ∈ [1 : n];
(f) follows since M1 − (Wi, Xi, Y1,i)− Y2,i forms a Markov chain.
Next, we have
n(R0 +R2) = H(M0,M2)
(a)
≤ I(M0,M2;M12, Y
n
2 ) + nκn
(b)
≤ I(M0,M2;Y
n
2 ) + nR12 + nκn
=
n∑
i=1
I(M0,M2;Y2,i|Y
n
2,i+1) + nR12 + nκn
(c)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(Wi;Y2,i) + nR12 + nκn (82)
where:
(a) is by (78);
(b) is because entropy is non-negative and is maximized by the uniform distribution;
(c) follows from the definition of Wi and because conditioning cannot increase entropy.
Finally, consider
n(R0 +R1 +R2) = H(M0,M1,M2)
(a)
≤ I(M0,M1,M2;Y
n
1 , Y
n
2 )− I(M1;Y
n
2 |M0,M2) + nηn
(b)
= I(M0,M1,M2;Y
n
1 )− I(M1;Y
n
2 |M0,M2) + nηn
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(c)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(M0,M1,M2, Y
n
2,i+1;Y1,i|Y
i−1
1 )− I(Y
n
2,i+1;Y1,i|M0,M1,M2, Y
i−1
1 )
− I(M1;Y2,i|M0,M2, Y
n
2,i+1)
]
+ nηn
(d)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(M0,M1,M2, Y
n
2,i+1;Y1,i|Y
i−1
1 )− I(Y
i−1
1 ;Y2,i|M0,M1,M2, Y
n
2,i+1)
− I(M1;Y2,i|M0,M2, Y
n
2,i+1)
]
+ nηn
≤
n∑
i=1
[
I(M0,M1,M2, Y
i−1
1 , Y
n
2,i+1;Y1,i)− I(M1, Y
i−1
1 ;Y2,i|M0,M2, Y
n
2,i+1)
]
+ nηn
(e)
≤
n∑
i=1
[
I(Wi;Y1,i) + I(M1;Y1,i|Wi)− I(M1;Y2,i|Wi)
]
+ nηn
(f)
≤
n∑
i=1
[
I(Wi;Y1,i) + I(Xi;Y1,i|Wi)− I(Xi;Y2,i|Wi)
]
+ nηn
(g)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(Xi;Y1,i)− I(Xi;Y2,i|Wi)
]
+ nηn (83)
where:
(a) uses (78) and the definition of ηn;
(b) is because (M0,M1,M2) − Y n1 − Y n2 forms a Markov chain, which is induced by the PD degraded and
memoryless property of the channel;
(c) is the mutual information chain rule;
(d) uses the Csisza´r sum identity;
(e) follows from the definitions of Wi and because conditioning cannot increase entropy;
(f) is by repeating steps (81a)-(81b);
(g ) is by the mutual information chain rule and because Wi−Xi−Y1,i forms a Markov chain (see Appendix E-B
for the proof).
By time-sharing arguments similar to those presented in Section VII-D, and by denoting W , (WT , T ), X , XT ,
Y1 , Y1,T and Y2 , Y2,T , we obtain the bounds of (18) with the small added terms κn and ηn, which approach 0
as n→∞. In Appendix E-B we shown that the chain
W −X − Y1 − Y2 (84)
is Markov, which establishes the converse.
VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
We considered cooperative BCs with one common and two private messages, where the private message to the
cooperative user is confidential. An inner bound on the strong secrecy-capacity region was established by deriving
a channel resolvability lemma and using it as a building block for the BC code. A resolvability-based Marton
code for the BC with a double-binning of the confidential message codebook was constructed, and the resolvability
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lemma was invoked to achieve strong secrecy. The cooperation protocol used the link from Decoder 1 to Decoder
2 to share information on a portion of the non-confidential message and the common message only. Removing
the secrecy constraint on M1 allows a more flexible cooperation scheme that in general achieves strictly higher
transmission rates [35]. The inner bound was shown to be tight for the SD and PD cases. Two separate converse
proofs were used because the structure of the joint PMFs describing the regions seem to require distinct choices
of auxiliary random variable.
The secrecy results were compared to those of the corresponding BCs without secrecy constraints, and the impact
of secrecy on the capacity regions was highlighted. Cooperative Blackwell and Gaussian BCs visualized the results.
An explicit coding scheme that achieves strong secrecy while maximizing the transmission rate of the confidential
message over the BBC was given. Further, it was shown that the strong secrecy-capacity region of the BBC remains
unchanged even if the subchannel to the legitimate user is noiseless.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5
Consider the channel depicted in Fig. 3. For simplicity of notation we relabel U0 =W , U1 = U and U2 = V in
RNS, which becomes the union of rate triples (R12, R1, R2) ∈ R3+ satisfying:
R1 ≤ I(W,U ;Y1) (85a)
R2 ≤ I(W,V ;Y2) +R12 (85b)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(U ;Y1|W ) + I(V ;Y2|W )− I(U ;V |W ) + min
{
I(W ;Y1), I(W ;Y2) +R12
}
(85c)
where the union is over all PMFs QW,U,V,X , each inducing a joint distribution QW,U,V,XQY1,Y2|X . Setting U0 =W ,
U1 = U and U2 = V into R˜NS, gives a region described by the same rate bounds as (85), up to replacing (85a)
with
R1 ≤ I(U ;Y1|W ) +
[
I(V ;Y2|W )− I(U ;V |W )
]+
. (86)
We outer bound R˜NS by loosening (86) to
R1 ≤ I(U ;Y1|W ). (87)
Let O˜NS denote the obtained outer bound on R˜NS. We show that under the considered example O˜NS ( RNS.
For any r ∈ R+, let
RNS(r) ,
{
(R1, R2) ∈ R
2
+
∣∣∣(r, R1, R2) ∈ RNS} (88a)
O˜NS(r) ,
{
(R1, R2) ∈ R
2
+
∣∣∣(r, R1, R2) ∈ O˜NS} (88b)
be the projections of RNS and O˜NS on the (R1, R2) plane for R12 = r. Let c = 1 − H2(0.1), where H2 is the
binary entropy function, and note that R1 = c is the maximal achievable rate of M1 in both CNS(c) and O˜NS(c).
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Define the supremum of all achievable R2 that preserve R1 = c in each region by
R⋆2 , sup
{
R2 ∈ R+
∣∣∣(c, R2) ∈ RNS(c)} (89a)
R˜⋆2 , sup
{
R2 ∈ R+
∣∣∣(c, R2) ∈ O˜NS(c)}. (89b)
We next evaluate R⋆2 and R˜⋆2, and then choose QY2|X1,X2 for which R⋆2 > R˜⋆2.
For RNS(c), setting W = X1 ∼ Ber
(
1
2
)
achieves R1 = c:
R1 = I(W,U ;Y1)
(a)
= I(X1;Y1) = c, (90)
where (a) follows because U −X1 − Y1 forms a Markov chain. Consequently, for R⋆2 we have
R⋆2
(a)
= sup
QU,V,X2|X1 :
(U,V )−(X1,X2)−Y2
min
{
I(X1, V ;Y2) + c , I(V ;Y2|X1)− I(U ;V |X1) , I(X1, V ;Y2)− I(U ;V |X1)
}
(b)
≥ sup
QV,X2|X1 :
V−(X1,X2)−Y2
I(V ;Y2|X1) (91)
where (a) uses the structure of RNS from (85) and the relations R12 = I(X1;Y1) = c and W = X1, while (b) is
by setting U = X1 and due to the non-negativity of mutual information.
For O˜NS(c), first note that R1 is upper bounded by c since
I(U ;Y1|W )
(a)
≤ I(W,U ;Y1)
(b)
≤ I(X1;Y1)
(c)
≤ c. (92)
However, R1 = c is also achievable: (a) becomes an inequality if and only if Y1 is independent of W ; (b) is
and equality if an only if X1 − (W,U) − Y1 forms a Markov chain (this step also uses the Markov relation
(W,U)−X1 − Y1; (c) holds with equality if and only if X1 ∼ Ber
(
1
2
)
.
Now, since Y1 and X1 are connected by a BSC, the independence of Y1 and W implies that X1 and W are also
independent. To see this observe that the independence of Y1 and W means that
QY1|W (0|w) = QY1|W (0|w
′), ∀(w,w′) ∈ W2, (93)
and assume by contradiction that a similar relation does not hold for X1 and W . Namely, assume that there exists
a pair (w,w′) ∈ W2, such that
QX1|W (0|w) 6= QX1|W (0|w
′). (94)
Denote QX1|W (0|w) = α and QX1|W (0|w′) = α′, where α, α′ ∈ [0, 1] and α 6= α′. Consider the following:
QY1|W (0|w)
(a)
= QX1|W (0|w)QY1|X1(0|0) +QX1|W (1|w)QY1|X1(0|1)
= 0.9α+ 0.1(1− α)
= 0.1 + 0.8α. (95)
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By repeating similar steps for QY1|W (0|w′), we get
QY1|W (0|w
′) = 0.1 + 0.8α′. (96)
Combining (95)-(96) with (93) gives that α = α′, which is a contradiction. Therefore X1 and W must be
independent.
Furthermore, recall that from the equality in step (b) in the derivation of (92), we have that X1 − (W,U)− Y1,
i.e.,
QX1,Y1|W,U (x1, y1|w, u) = QX1|W,U (x1|w, u)QY1|W,U (y1|w, u), ∀(w, u, x1, y1) ∈ W × U × X1 × Y1. (97)
Since (W,U)−X1 − Y1 is also a Markov chain, we have that QX1,Y1|W,U also factors as
QX1,Y1|W,U (x1, y1|w, u) = QX1|W,U (x1|w, u)QY1|X1(y1|x1), ∀(w, u, x1, y1) ∈ W × U × X1 × Y1. (98)
Therefore, for every (w, u, x1, y1) ∈ W × U × X1 × Y1, either QX1|W,U (x1|w, u) = 0 or QY1|W,U (y1|w, u) =
QY1|X1(y1|x1). In particular, for (x1, y1) = (1, 1) and any (w, u) ∈ W × U , either
QX1|W,U (1|w, u) = 0 (99a)
or
QY1|W,U (1|w, u) = QY1|X1(1|1) = 0.9. (99b)
If (99b) is true, then
QY1|W,U (1|w, u)
(a)
= QX1|W,U (0|w, u)QY1|X1(1|0) +QX1|W,U (1|w, u)QY1|X1(1|1)
= 0.1 ·QX1|W,U (0|w, u) + 0.9 ·QX1|W,U (1|w, u)
= 0.1 + 0.8 ·QX1|W,U (1|w, u) (100)
where (a) uses the Markov chain (W,U)−X1 − Y1. When combined with (99b), this gives
QX1|W,U (1|w, u) = 1, (101)
Thus, for any (w, u) ∈ W × U either (99a) or (101) is true, which implies that X1 is a deterministic function of
(W,U).
Having this, we upper bound R˜⋆2 as follows.
R˜⋆2
(a)
= sup
QWQU,V,X2|W,X1 :
(W,U,V )−(X1,X2)−Y2
min


I(W,V ;Y2) + c , I(V ;Y2|W )− I(U ;V |W )
, I(U ;Y1|W ) + I(W,V ;Y2)− I(U ;V |W )


(b)
= sup
QWQU,V,X2|X1,W :
(W,U,V )−(X1,X2)−Y2
I(V ;Y2|W )− I(U ;V |W )
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(c)
= sup
QWQU,V,X2|X1,W :
(W,U,V )−(X1,X2)−Y2
I(V ;Y2|W )− I(U,X1;V |W )
≤ sup
QWQV,X2|X1,W :
(W,V )−(X1,X2)−Y2
I(V ;Y2|W )− I(V ;X1|W )
(d)
≤ max
w∈W
sup
QV,X2|X1,W=w:
Vw−(X1,X2,w)−Y2
I(V ;Y2|W = w) − I(V ;X1|W = w)
≤ sup
QV,X2|X1 :
V−(X1,X2)−Y2
I(V ;Y2)− I(V ;X1) (102)
where:
(a) uses the structure of O˜NS, the independence of W and X1 and the relation R12 = I(W,U ;Y1) = c;
(b) follows by the non-negativity of mutual information;
(c) is because X1 is deterministically defined by (W,U);
(d) is by defining (Vw , X2,w) to be a pair of random variables jointly distributed with X1 ∼ Ber
(
1
2
)
according to
QX1QV,X2|X1,W=w, where w ∈ W .
The lower bound on R⋆2 from (91) is the capacity of the state-dependent channel QY2|X1,X2 with non-causal CSI
Xn1 available at both the transmitting and receiving ends. The upper bound on R˜⋆2 given in (102) is the capacity of
the corresponding GP channel, i.e., with non-causal transmitter CSI only. Thus, to show that R˜⋆2 < R⋆2 it suffices to
choose QY2|X1,X2 for which the GP capacity is strictly less than the capacity with full CSI. A simple example for
which these capacities are different is the binary dirty-paper (BDP) channel. Specifically, let QY2|X1,X2 be defined
by
Y2 = X2 ⊕X1 ⊕ Z (103)
where ⊕ denotes modulo 2 addition, X1 ∼ Ber
(
1
2
)
plays the role of the channel’s state, and the noise Z ∼ Ber(ǫ),
with ǫ ∈
[
0, 12
]
is independent of (X1, X2). The input X2 is subject to a constraint 1nwH(x2) ≤ q, for q ∈
[
0, 12
]
,
where wH :
{
0, 1
}n
→ N∪
{
0
}
is the Hamming weight function. For the BDP channel, the GP capacity is [45]–[47]
C
(BDP)
GP = maxQV,X2|X1 :
V−(X1,X2)−Y2
I(V ;Y2)− I(V ;Y1) = uce
{[
Hb(q)−Hb(ǫ)
]+} (104)
where ‘uce’ is the upper convex envelope operation with respect to q (ǫ is constant). On the other hand, the capacity
of the BDP channel with full CSI is [45]–[47]
C
(BDP)
F−CSI = maxQV,X2|X1 :
V−(X1,X2)−Y2
I(V ;Y2|X1) = Hb(q ∗ ǫ)−Hb(ǫ) (105)
where q ∗ ǫ = q(1 − ǫ) + (1 − q)ǫ. Clearly, q and ǫ can be chosen to yield C(BDP)GP < C
(BDP)
F−CSI, which shows that
RNS and R˜NS are not equal in general.
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APPENDIX B
CONVERSE PROOF FOR (30)
To prove the optimality of (30), we show that C(PD)S ⊆ C(G)S (C(PD)S and C(G)S are given by (18) and (30),
respectively). First consider
1
2
log(2πeN1) = h(Z1) = h(Y1|X)
(a)
≤ h(Y1|W ) ≤ h(Y1) ≤
1
2
log
(
2πe(P +N1)
) (106)
where (a) is because W − X − Y1 forms a Markov chain. The intermediate-value theorem and (106) imply that
there is an α ∈ [0, 1], such that
h(Y1|W ) =
1
2
log
(
2πe(αP +N1)
)
. (107)
Further, for every w ∈ W , we have
h(Y2|W = w) = h(Y1 + Z2|W = w)
(a)
≥
1
2
log
(
22h(Y1|W=w) + 22h(Z2|W=w)
)
(b)
=
1
2
log
(
22h(Y1|W=w) + 2πe(N2 −N1)
)
(108)
where (a) uses the conditional entropy-power inequality (EPI), while (b) follows by the independence of Z2 and
W . Using (108), we lower bound h(Y2|W ) in terms of h(Y1|W ) as
h(Y2|W ) = EW
[
h(Y2|W )
]
(a)
≥ EW
[
1
2
log
(
22h(Y1|W ) + 2πe(N2 −N1)
)]
(b)
≥
1
2
log
(
22EW
[
h(Y1|W )
]
+ 2πe(N2 −N1)
)
=
1
2
log
(
22h(Y1|W ) + 2πe(N2 −N1)
)
=
1
2
log
(
2πe(αP +N2)
) (109)
where (a) follows from (108), while (b) uses the convexity of the function x 7→ log(2x+c) for c ∈ R+ and Jensen’s
inequality.
Having this, we present the following upper bounds of the information terms in the RHS of (18). For (18a), we
have
I(X ;Y1|W )− I(X ;Y2|W )
(a)
= h(Y1|W )− h(Y1|X)− h(Y2|W ) + h(Y2|X)
(b)
≤
1
2
log
(
1 +
αP
N1
)
−
1
2
log
(
1 +
αP
N2
)
(110)
where (a) follows since the chain W −X− (Y1, Y2) is Markov, while (b) relies on (107), (109) and on the Gaussian
distribution being the maximizer of the differential entropy under a variance constraint. Next, using (109) we bound
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the RHS of (18b) as
I(W ;Y2) +R12 = h(Y2)− h(Y2|W ) +R12 ≤
1
2
log
(
1 +
α¯P
αP +N2
)
+R12. (111)
By repeating arguments similar to those in the derivation of (110), we bound the sum of rates R1 +R2 as
R1 +R2 ≤
1
2
log
(
1 +
P
N1
)
−
1
2
log
(
1 +
αP
N2
)
. (112)
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
For a fixed codebook Bn and every (s0, s,v) ∈ Sn0 × Sn × Vn, we have
P (Bn)(s0, s,v) = Q
n
S0,S(s0, s)
∑
(w,i)∈W×I
2−nR˜Pˆ (Bn)(i|w, s0, s)Q
n
V |U,S0,S
(
v
∣∣u(s0, w, i,Bn), s0, s). (113)
Let (s0, s,v) ∈ Sn0 ×Sn×Vn be a triple such that QnS0,S,V (s0, s,v) = 0. Clearly, if Q
n
S0,S
(s0, s) = 0 then (113)
implies that P (Bn)(s0, s,v) = 0. Thus, we henceforth assume that QnS0,S(s0, s) > 0 and Q
n
V |S0,S
(v|s0, s) = 0. By
expanding
QnV |S0,S(v|s0, s) =
∑
u∈supp
(
Qn
U|S0=s0,S=s
)
QnU|S0,S(u|s0, s)Q
n
V |U,S0,S
(v|u, s0, s) (114)
we have QnV |U,S0,S(v|u, s0, s) = 0 for every u ∈ supp
(
QnU|S0=s0,S=s
)
. Thus, to complete the proof it suffices to
show that every u-codeword that is transmitted with positive probability is in supp
(
QnU|S0=s0,S=s
)
.
By the construction of the codebook, every u ∈ Bn also satisfies u ∈ supp
(
QnU|S0=s0
)
. Moreover, a necessary
condition for a codeword u(s0, w, i,Bn) to be chosen by the encoder with positive probability is Pˆ (Bn)(i|w, s0, s) >
0, which by the definition of the likelihood encoder implies that QnS|U,S0
(
s
∣∣u(s0, w, i,Bn), s0) > 0. Combining the
above, we have that if a codeword u(s0, w, i,Bn) is transmitted with positive probability then
QnU|S0,S
(
u(s0, w, i,Bn)
∣∣s0, s) = QnS0,S,U
(
s0, s,u(s0, w, i,Bn)
)
QnS0,S(s0, s)
=
QnS0(s0)Q
n
U|S0
(
u(s0, w, i,Bn)
∣∣s0)QnS|U,S0(s∣∣u(s0, w, i,Bn), s0)
QnS0,S(s0, s)
> 0.
APPENDIX D
ERROR PROBABILITY ANALYSIS FOR THEOREM 1
Since we evaluate the expected value (over the codebook ensemble) of the error probability and because
the code is symmetric with respect to the uniformly distributed tuple (Mp,M1,M22,M), we may assume that
(Mp,M1,M22,W ) = 1 = (1, 1, 1, 1) is chosen.
Encoding Error: An encoding error occurs if the u1-codeword chosen by the likelihood encoder is not jointly
typical with
(
U0(Mp),U2(Mp,M22)
)
. Based on the aforementioned symmetry, we set the event of an encoding
error as
E =
{(
U0(1),U1(1, 1, 1, I),U2(1, 1)
)
/∈ T nǫ (QU0,U1,U2)
}
. (115)
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Abbreviating T , T nǫ (QU0,U1,U2), we have
EBnPP (Bn)
((
U0(Mp),U1(Mp,M1,W, I),U2(Mp,M22)
)
/∈ T
)
(a)
= EBnPP (Bn)
((
U0(1),U1(1, 1, 1, I),U2(1, 1)
)
/∈ T
∣∣∣(Mp,M1,M22,W ) = 1)
= EBn
[ ∑
i,u0,u1,u2
1{(
U0(1),U2(1,1)
)
=(u0,u2)
}Pˆ (Bn)BC (i|1,u0,u2)1{U1(1,1,1,i)=u1}1{(u0,u1,u2)/∈T }
]
(b)
= EB0,2
[ ∑
i,u0,u1,u2
1{(
U0(1),U2(1,1)
)
=(u0,u2)
}
× EB1|B0,2
[
Pˆ
(Bn)
BC (i|1,u0,u2)× 1
{
U1(1,1,1,i)=u1
}∣∣∣∣B0,2
]
1{
(u0,u1,u2)/∈T
}]
(c)
= E
B˜n
[ ∑
i,u0,u1,u2
QnU0,U2(u0,u2)P˜
(B˜n)(i|1,u0,u2)1{
U˜1(u0,1,i)=u1
}1{
(u0,u1,u2)/∈T
}]
= E
B˜n
PQn
U0,U2
×P˜ (B˜n)
((
U0, U˜1
(
U0, 1, I
)
,U2
)
/∈ T
)
(116)
where:
(a) uses the symmetry of the code construction;
(b) applies the law of total expectation in a similar fashion to (58) (an inner expectation over B1 conditioned on
B0,2, and an outer expectation over the possible values of B0,2);
(c) follows by defining (analogously to (59))
Pˆ
(Bn)
BC (i|1,u0,u2) = 0 (117)
whenever u0 6= u0(1,B0) or u2 6= u2(1, 1,B0,2), and observing that for any B0,2 we have
EB1|B0,2
[
Pˆ
(Bn)
BC (i|1,u0,u2)1
{
U1(1,1,1,i)=u1
}∣∣∣B0,2 = B0,2]
= EB1|B0,2PP (Bn)
(
I = i,U1(1, 1, 1, i) = u1
∣∣∣(Mp,M1,W ) = 1,B0,2 = B0,2)
≤ E
B˜n
PP˜ (B˜n)
(
I = i, U˜1(u0, 1, i) = u1
∣∣∣W = 1,U0 = u0,U2 = u2)
where the last step follows by intersecting the event of interest with
{(
u0(1,B0),u2(1, 1,B0,2)
)
= (u0,u2)
}
(otherwise the probability is zero due to (117)) and recalling that
P˜ (B˜n)(w, i, u˜1,y2|u0,u2) = 2
−nR˜P˜ (B˜n)(i|w,u0,u2)1{
u˜1(u0,w,i,B˜n)=u˜1
}QnY2|U0,U1,U2(y2|u0, u˜1,u2) (118)
as given in (61). The inequality then follows by removing the intersection with the aforementioned event and since
B˜n and Bn are independent.
Since the PMF QnU0,U2 P˜
(B˜n)
W,I,U1|U0,U2
is merely a relabeling of the induced distribution (8) in our resolvability
setup, Lemma 2 gives that the RHS of (116) approaches 0 as n→∞, as long as (55a)-(55b) are satisfied.
Decoding Errors: To simplify notation, the following error events are defined with respect to a new PMF
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Λ ∈ P(Bn × I × Y
n
1 × Y
n
2 ) that describes the random experiment of transmitting (MP ,M1,M22,W ) = 1 using
a random codebook. Specifically, we set
Λ
(
Bn, i,y1,y2
)
= µ(Bn)Pˆ
(Bn)
BC
(
i
∣∣1,u0(1),u2(1, 1))
×QnY1,Y2|U0,U1,U2
(
y1,y2
∣∣u0(1),u1(1, 1, 1, i),u2(1, 1)) (119)
where Pˆ (Bn)BC
(
i
∣∣1,u0(1),u2(1, 1)) is defined in (51) and
QY1,Y2|U0,U1,U2(y1, y2|u0, u1, u2) ,
∑
x∈X
PX|U0,U1,U2(x|u0, u1, u2)QY1,Y2|X(y1, y2|x).
The definition of Λ omits the dependence of a given codeword on its codebook, e.g., we write u0(1) instead of the
notation u0(1,B0) that was used before.
Now, to account for decoding errors, define
D0 =
{(
U0(1),U1(1, 1, 1, I),U2(1, 1),Y1,Y2
)
∈ T nǫ (QU0,U1,U2,Y1,Y2)
}
(120a)
D1(mp,m1, w) =
{(
U0(mp),U1(mp,m1, w, I),Y1
)
∈ T nǫ (QU0,U1,Y1)
}
(120b)
Dj(mp,m22) =
{(
U0(mp),U2(mp,m22),Y2
)
∈ T nǫ (QU0,U2,Y2)
}
. (120c)
By the union bound, the expected error probability is bounded as
EBnPe(Cn) ≤ PΛ

E ∪ Dc0 ∪ D1(1, 1, 1, I)c ∪ D2(1, 1)c ∪

 ⋃
(m˜p,m˜1,w˜) 6=(1,1,1)
D1(m˜p, m˜1, w˜, I)


∪


⋃
(m˜p,m˜22) 6=(1,1):
m˜p∈S
(
mˆ12(1)
)D2(m˜p, m˜22)




≤ PΛ
(
E
)
+ PΛ
(
Dc0 ∩ E
c
)
+ PΛ
(
D1(1, 1, 1, I)
c ∩ D0
)
+ PΛ

 ⋃
(m˜p,m˜1,w˜) 6=(1,1,1)
D1(m˜p, m˜1, w˜, I)


+ PΛ
(
D2(1, 1)
c ∩D0
)
+ PΛ


⋃
(m˜p,m˜22) 6=(1,1):
m˜p∈S
(
mˆ12(1)
)D2(m˜p, m˜22)


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≤ PΛ
(
E
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
P
[1]
0
+PΛ
(
Dc0 ∩ E
c
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
P
[2]
0
+PΛ
(
D1(1, 1, 1, I)
c ∩D0
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
P
[1]
1
+
∑
i˜∈I
Λ
(˜
i
)
PΛ

 ⋃
m˜p 6=1
D1(m˜p, 1, 1, i˜)


︸ ︷︷ ︸
P
[2]
1
+ PΛ

 ⋃
(m˜1,w˜) 6=(1,1),
i˜∈I
D1(1, m˜1, w˜, i˜)


︸ ︷︷ ︸
P
[3]
1
+PΛ

 ⋃
(m˜p,m˜1,w˜) 6=(1,1,1),
i˜∈I
D1(m˜p, m˜1, w˜, i˜)


︸ ︷︷ ︸
P
[4]
1
+PΛ
(
D2(1, 1)
c ∩ D0
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
P
[1]
2
+ PΛ


⋃
m˜p 6=1:
m˜p∈S
(
mˆ12(1)
)D2(m˜p, 1)


︸ ︷︷ ︸
P
[2]
2
+PΛ

 ⋃
m˜22 6=1
D2(1, m˜22)


︸ ︷︷ ︸
P
[3]
2
+PΛ


⋃
(m˜p,m˜22) 6=(1,1):
m˜p∈S
(
mˆ12(1)
) D2(m˜p, m˜22)


︸ ︷︷ ︸
P
[4]
2
.
(121)
Note that P [1]0 is the probability of an encoding error, while P
[2]
0 and P
[k]
j , for k ∈ [1 : 4], correspond to decoding
errors by Decoder j. We proceed with the following steps:
1) The encoding error analysis shows that P [1]0 → 0 as n → ∞ if (55a)-(55b) hold, while the Conditional
Typicality Lemma [53, Section 2.5] implies that P [2]0 → 0 as n grows. Furthermore, the definitions in (120)
clearly imply that P [1]j = 0, for all n ∈ N.
2) For P [3]1 , we have
P
[3]
1
(a)
≤
∑
(m˜1,w˜) 6=(1,1),
i˜∈I
2−n
(
I(U1;Y1|U0)−δ
[3]
1 (ǫ)
)
≤ 2n(R1+R˜+R
′)2−n
(
I(U1;Y1|U0)−δ
[3]
1 (ǫ)
)
= 2n
(
R1+R˜+R
′−I(U1;Y1|U0)+δ
[3]
1 (ǫ)
)
where (a) follows since for any (m˜1, w˜) 6= (1, 1) and i˜ ∈ I, U1(1, m˜1, w˜, i˜) is independent of Y1 while both
of them are drawn conditioned on U0(1). Moreover, δ[3]1 (ǫ) → 0 as ǫ → 0. Hence, for the probability P
[3]
1
to vanish as n→∞, we take:
R1 + R˜+R
′ < I(U1;Y1|U0). (122)
3) For P [4]1 , consider
P
[4]
1
(a)
≤
∑
(m˜p,m˜1,w˜) 6=(1,1,1),
i˜∈I
2−n
(
I(U0,U1;Y1)−δ
[4]
1 (ǫ)
)
≤ 2n(Rp+R1+R˜+R
′)2−n
(
I(U0,U1;Y1)−δ
[4]
1 (ǫ)
)
45
= 2n
(
Rp+R1+R˜+R
′−I(U0,U1;Y1)+δ
[4]
1 (ǫ)
)
where (a) follows since for any (m˜p, m˜1, w˜) 6= (1, 1, 1) and i˜ ∈ I, U0(m˜p) and U1(m˜p, m˜1, w˜, i˜) are
correlated with one another but independent of Y1. As before, δ[4]1 (ǫ)→ 0 as ǫ→ 0, and therefore, we have
that P [4]1 → 0 as n→∞ if
Rp +R1 + R˜+R
′ < I(U0, U1;Y1). (123)
4) Similar steps as in the upper bound of P [3]1 show that the rate bound that ensures that P [2]1 → 0 as n→ ∞
is redundant. This is since for every m˜p 6= 1 and i˜ ∈ I, the codewords U0(m˜p) and U1(m˜p, 1, 1, i˜) are
independent of Y1. Hence, we find that
Rp < I(U0, U1;Y1) (124)
suffices for P [2]1 to vanish. However, the RHS of (124) coincides with the RHS of (123), while the left-hand
side (LHS) of (124) is with respect to Rp only. Clearly, (123) is the dominating constraint.
5) By a similar argument, we find that P [j]2 , for j = 2, 3, 4, vanishes with n if
R22 < I(U2;Y2|U0) (125)
Rp +R22 −R12 < I(U0, U2;Y2). (126)
Summarizing the above results, and substituting Rp = R0 + R20, we find that the RHS of (121) decays as the
blocklength n→∞ if the conditions in (55) are met.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THE MARKOV RELATION IN (77) AND (84)
We prove that (77) and (84) form Markov chains by using the notions of d-separation and fd-separation in
functional dependence graphs (FDGs), for which we use the formulation from [54]. Throughout this appendix all
probabilities are taken with respect to the PMF P (cn) that is induced by cn and given in (12). For brevity, we omit
the superscript and write P instead of P (cn).
A. Proof of (77)
By the definitions of the auxiliaries W and V , it suffices to show that
(M0,M1,M2,M12, Y
t−1
1 , Y
n
2,t+1, Y1,t)−Xt − Y2,t (127)
forms a Markov chain for every t ∈ [1 : n]. In fact, we prove the stronger relation
(M0,M1,M2, Y
n
1 , Y
n
2,t+1)−Xt − Y2,t (128)
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Fig. 11: (a) The FDG that stems from (129): (128) follows since C = {Xt} d-separates A = {Y2,t} from
B =
{
M1,M2, Y
n
1 , Y
n
2,t+1
}
. (b) The undirected graph obtained from the FDG after the manipulations described in
Definition [54, Definition 1]. Both FDGs omit the dependence of the channel outputs on the noise.
PSfrag replacements
M0 M2M1
Xt−1
Xt
Xnt+1
Y t−11
Y t−12
Y1,t
Y2,t
Y n1,t+1
Y n2,t+1
(a)
PSfrag replacements
M0 M2M1
Xt−1
Xt
Xnt+1
Y t−11
Y t−12
Y1,tY2,t Y n1,t+1
Y n2,t+1
(b)
PSfrag replacements
M0 M2M1
Xt−1
Xt
Xnt+1
Y t−11
Y t−12
Y1,t
Y2,t
Y n1,t+1
Y n2,t+1
(c)
Fig. 12: (a) The FDG that stems from (131): (130) follows since Cj d-separates Aj from Bj , for j = 1, 2. (b) The
undirected graph that corresponds to A1, B1 and C1. (c) The undirected graph that corresponds to A2, B2 and C2.
The FDGs omit the dependence of the channel outputs on the noise.
from which (127) follows because M12 is a function of Y n1 . Since the channel is SD, memoryless and without
feedback, for every (m0,m1,m2) ∈ M0 ×M1 ×M2, (xn, yn1 , yn2 ) ∈ Xn × Yn1 × Yn2 and t ∈ [1 : n], we have
P (m0,m1,m2, x
n, yn1 , y
n
2 ) = P (m0)P (m1)P (m2)P (x
n|m0,m1,m2)P
(
yt−11
∣∣xt−1)P (yt−12 ∣∣xt−1)
× P (y1,t|xt)P (y2,t|xt)P
(
yn1,t+1
∣∣xnt+1)P (yn2,t+1∣∣xnt+1). (129)
Fig. 11(a) shows the FDG induced by (129). The structure of FDGs allows one to establish the conditional
statistical independence of sets of random variables by using d-separation. The Markov relation in (128) follows
by setting A =
{
Y2,t
}
, B =
{
M0,M1,M2, Y
n
1 , Y
n
2,t+1
}
and C =
{
Xt
}
, and noting that C d-separates A from B
by applying the manipulations described in [54, Definition 1].
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B. Proof of (84)
To prove (84), is suffices to show that Markov relations
(M0,M2, Y
t−1
1 , Y
n
2,t+1)−Xt − Y1,t (130a)
(M0,M2, Y
t−1
1 , Y
n
2,t+1, Xt)− Y1,t − Y2,t (130b)
hold for every t ∈ [1 : n]. By the PD property of the channel, and because it is memoryless and without feedback,
for every (m0,m1,m2) ∈M0 ×M1 ×M2, (xn, yn1 , yn2 ) ∈ Xn × Yn1 × Yn2 and t ∈ [1 : n], we have
P (m0,m1,m2, x
n, yn1 , y
n
2 ) = P (m0)P (m1)P (m2)P (x
n|m0,m1,m2)P
(
yt−11
∣∣xt−1)P (yt−12 ∣∣yt−11 )
× P (y1,t|xt)P (y2,t|y1,t)P
(
yn1,t+1
∣∣xnt+1)P (yn2,t+1∣∣yn1,t+1). (131)
The FDG induced by (131) is shown in Fig. 12(a). Set A1 =
{
Y1,t
}
, B1 =
{
M0,M2, Y
i−1
1 , Y
n
2,t+1
}
and
C1 =
{
Xt
}
, and A2 =
{
Y2,t
}
, B2 =
{
M0,M2, Y
i−1
1 , Y
n
2,t+1, Xt
}
and C2 =
{
Y1,t
}
. The relations in (130) follow
by noting that Cj d-separates Aj from Bj , for j = 1, 2 by applying the manipulations described in [54, Definition
1].
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